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INTRODUCTION
Since the election of Donald J. Trump as the President of the
United States, immigrant communities - and the advocates and le-
gal professionals who serve them - have been thrust into a state of
fear and uncertainty. Policy changes have already begun to tighten
access to legal protections for immigrants, including asylum seek-
ers,1 proving that campaign rhetoric targeting immigrants and ref-
ugees was more than just empty election-season promises.2 Law
and policy makers seem intent on limiting vulnerable populations’
access to humanitarian protection.3 As a result, immigration law-
yers representing asylum seekers are likely to find that their advo-
cacy is needed at every stage of the asylum process, even in
ensuring that those traveling to the U.S. border have access to the
asylum adjudication system.
In addition, immigration attorneys have long struggled with a
string of precedent-setting cases limiting due process at the border
and have fought as officials created broadly-defined enforcement
tools without sufficient forethought on how subsequent administra-
tion could use those programs. Although advocates have never
stopped their efforts to fix a broken system, now more than ever is
the time to push back, disrupt, and rethink ways to reopen ongoing
issues.
On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed two executive
orders, entitled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcements”
and “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,”
and on February 20, 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
1 See Exec. Order No 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 06, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793
(Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Memoran-
dum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Implementing the President’s Border
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter
Kelly, Implementing], https://perma.cc/3H39-7JHS; Memorandum from John Kelly,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National
Interest (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Kelly, Enforcement], https://perma.cc/U22P-
CPAN; Julia Edwards Ansley, Exclusive: Trump Administration Considering Separating Wo-
men, Children at Mexico Border, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2017, 3:13 PM), https://perma.cc/
PX3M-52CX; Chris Hayes & Brian Montopoli, Exclusive: Trump Admin. Plans Expanded
Immigrant Detention, MSNBC (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:13 PM), https://perma.cc/7T3N-2FLE.
2 See Jamie Winders, Immigration and the 2016 Election, 56 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRA-
PHER 291 (2016), for a brief description of the 2016 U.S. presidential candidates’ atti-
tudes toward immigration.
3 See Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 391, 115th Cong.
(2017); see also Eleanor Acer & Tara Magner, Restoring America’s Commitment to Refugees
and Humanitarian Protection, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 445 (2013); Kelly, Implementing, supra
note 1.
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curity (“DHS”) issued two memoranda describing the orders’ im-
plementation.4 Multiple provisions in these orders and
memoranda exacerbate challenges refugees already faced when
seeking asylum in the United States, lay the groundwork for proce-
dures that could turn asylum seekers away at the border altogether,
and send a clear message of acquiescence towards abuse by
frontline officers.5
The ability to seek protection in the United States is a right
enshrined in international law and codified in U.S. statute.6 While
all who claim a fear of return to their home country are not neces-
sarily entitled to relief from removal,7 the baseline right to apply
for protection and have that claim considered is at the core of a
legal regime established to protect those fleeing persecution. Yet,
the United States continues to erect barriers to those seeking asy-
lum – apart from, and much more consequential than – a physical
wall.
Thousands of families and children fleeing extreme violence
and instability in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador – known
as the Northern Triangle – as well as other countries, continue to
arrive at the U.S.-Mexico border.8 The United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), a United Nations (“U.N.”)
agency mandated to protect refugees, and others, have found this
4 Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note 1; Exec. Order No 13768, supra note 1; Kelly,
Implementing, supra note 1; Kelly, Enforcement, supra note 1.
5 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASYLUM UNDER THREAT (2017), https://perma.cc/
6S8J-KWTT (“[T]he executive order and the DHS memoranda appear to subject asy-
lum seekers to even tougher initial screenings, lengthy periods in immigration deten-
tion, expanded summary processing, and some kind of rocket docket asylum
adjudications.”).
6 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol Relating to Refugees],
https://perma.cc/522Y-2Q67.
7 Under current statutory and regulatory provisions, individuals may be granted
asylum if they meet the definition of “refugee” or qualify for protection under the
Convention Against Torture. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42) (2017); 8
C.F.R. § 208.18 (2017).
8 41,435 “unaccompanied alien children” (“UACs”) were apprehended at the
border during Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2017, and 75,622 family units during the same pe-
riod, nearly 30% fewer UACs and 3% fewer family units than were apprehended dur-
ing FY 2016. Compare Southwest Border Migration, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION
(Nov. 3, 2017) [hereinafter CBP, FY 2016], https://perma.cc/NR6L-QB26], with
United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children
Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (last visited Dec.
7, 2017), https://perma.cc/3LF5-GJ46 (showing that in FY 2016, 59,692 UACs and
77,674 family units crossed the U.S. southwest border).
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Central American population to be largely protection seeking.9
While more Mexicans are leaving the United States than coming,
and have been for some time,10 Central Americans fleeing violence
and unrest continue to arrive,11 as do albeit in lower numbers,
Mexican asylum seekers fleeing persecution in Mexico.12 In fiscal
year 2016, over 77,000 families and over 59,000 unaccompanied
children arrived at the border to seek asylum.13 While data on how
many people requested protection when encountering U.S. border
authorities is unavailable, about 18,500 persons were referred from
ports of entry for initial protection screening interviews by asylum
officers in Fiscal Year 2017.14 While numbers dropped in June
2017, thousands continue to seek protection at the U.S. border.15
As discussed in detail below, asylum seekers arriving at ports of en-
try and along the border have the right to present themselves to
border officers to seek protection,16 and their reception at the bor-
der and referral to asylum proceedings is the essential step in giv-
ing that right meaning.
Unfortunately, the door to the U.S. asylum system has already
begun to close, and the policy changes detailed by President
Trump’s executive orders and DHS’s memoranda threaten to slam
it shut. In response to a growing number of asylum-seeking mi-
grants at its southern border, the United States under the Obama
Administration, funded greater efforts to externalize the U.S. bor-
9 See UNHCR., CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CEN-
TRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 4-5 (2014),
https://perma.cc/F7SE-NZQH; UNHCR, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS
OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO 2-3 (2015),
https://perma.cc/QTZ4-Q45S; see also MICHAEL GARCIA BOCHENEK, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, CLOSED DOORS: MEXICO’S FAILURE TO PROTECT CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE
AND MIGRANT CHILDREN 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/88K6-ZRTJ.
10 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S., PEW RES.
CTR. HISP. TRENDS (Nov. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/CNH3-3H48.
11 See CBP, FY 2016, supra note 8.
12 See SARA CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, MEXICAN AND
CENTRAL AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS 1-2 (2014) [hereinafter AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL], https://perma.cc/7EVY-U4UW.
13 CBP, FY 2016, supra note 8.
14 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR STATISTICS AND NA-
TIONALITY REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/L2K6-PNW5.
15 Between October 2016 and June 2017 (the last month for which statistics were
available at the time of publication) USCIS received 61,063 credible fear interview
requests, 18,533 of which came from ports of entry. See id.
16 The Immigration and Nationality Act provides, “Any alien who is physically pre-
sent in the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespective of such
alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applica-
ble, section 1225(b) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2017); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1) (2017).
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der through increased Mexican enforcement along Mexico’s
southern border;17 failed to refer all those expressing a fear of re-
turn to an initial protection interview, or turned them away com-
pletely;18 and ignored unlawful turn-back of asylum seekers
altogether.19 Many of these policies and practices are being
adopted and expanded under the Trump Administration.20
Moreover, the Trump Administration has sought to “enhance”
protection screening interviews,21 called credible fear and reasona-
ble fear interviews.22 Through adjustments to training materials,
DHS appears to be raising the bar for what asylum seekers must
prove to asylum officers at preliminary screening interviews.23 Fur-
thermore, even these interviews are only available to those asylum
seekers whom U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) of-
ficers appropriately refer for further screening upon their expres-
sion of fear at the border.24
This paper will examine the increased need to protect the
right to seek protection in the United States, focusing on the rights
of those presenting themselves to U.S. authorities at ports of entry
and along the U.S. border. Through an examination of the barri-
ers that asylum seekers face in reaching the U.S. border and seek-
17 GEORGETOWN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, THE COST OF STEMMING THE TIDE:
HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN SOUTHERN MEXICO LIMIT MIGRANT
CHILDREN’S ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14 (2015), https://perma.cc/
NB9K-B8SN.
18 See ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 21-23 (2016), https://perma.cc/BJ6K-AW2Z; ACLU, AMERICAN
EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 37-40 (2014), https://per
ma.cc/LUE9-9MSD.
19 See AMNESTY INT’L, FACING WALLS: USA AND MEXICO’S VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS
OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS 19-22 (Jun. 15, 2017) https://perma.cc/H34V-ML65; HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEK-
ERS (2017), https://perma.cc/R7E8-DSM8; Letter from American Immigration Coun-
cil et. al to Meghan H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan.13, 2017)
[hereinafter Letter from American Immigration Council], https://perma.cc/4AHK-
ZM29.
20 See Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note 1; Exec. Order No 13768, supra note 1;
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19.
21 See Letter from Eleanor Acer, Senior Director, Refugee Protection, Human
Rights First, to Lori Scialabba, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (Mar. 10,
2017), https://perma.cc/99JG-R5CF.
22 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16, 1208.17, 1208.18 (2017).
23 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND
TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 13-42 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON
PLAN], https://perma.cc/2X6E-5REC.
24 See 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(b)(4) (2017).
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ing asylum there, the paper will provide a framework for legal
practitioners to understand asylum seekers’ rights when arriving at
the border and seeking protection in the United States, as well as
the limitations on restricting access to those rights.
Section I will summarize the history and intent behind the de-
velopment of asylum protection, examining both domestic and in-
ternational commitments of the United States. Section II will
examine attempts to limit access to protection and undermine the
rights of those seeking protection at the U.S.-Mexico border. This
section will address: efforts to externalize the border and construct
barriers to prevent access to the U.S. border; CBP’s role in refer-
ring protection seekers to screening interviews and the due-process
“black hole” that results from a lack of safeguards; the credible and
reasonable fear interview standards; and the limited due process
protections at this stage of the asylum system. Finally, the paper will
examine efforts to summarily deny access to the United States’ pro-
tection system, including analysis of the safe-third country concept,
its limitations and due process requirements, and recent proposals
to turn migrants back to Mexico pending adjudication of their
cases before a U.S. immigration court. Throughout each section,
the paper will discuss the role of attorneys in protecting the right
to seek protection and the growing need for intervention at every
stage of the process.
I. ACCESS TO PROTECTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Migration as an element of human existence on the planet is
as old as history itself. Tracking the first migrants requires anthro-
pological analysis into the very origins of humanity. In comparison,
the concept of refugees – those fleeing persecution based on five
narrowly tailored protected grounds – is a recently constructed cat-
egory of people on the move who are afforded certain additional
rights,25 derived from nation states’ commitments, enshrined in in-
ternational and domestic law, to protect those who flee a recog-
nized form of persecution. “Access to asylum,” or “access to
protection,” as used throughout this paper, refers not solely to the
granting of permanent status within a host country (generally
called asylum or refugee status) but rather to the initial access
25 For a complete distillation of the rights international law affords to all migrants,
and the additional rights granted to those meeting the definition of a refugee, see
The IMBR Initiative, International Migrants Bill of Rights, with Commentary, 28 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 23 (2013).
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upon arrival to a potential host State’s system for adjudicating pro-
tection claims. In this case, we examine the United States’ interna-
tional and domestic commitments to ensure no migrant is denied
appropriate adjudication of his or her protection claim or pre-
cluded access to such protection mechanisms through other
means, as a threshold matter underpinning all refugee law.
A. Access to Protection in International Refugee Law
A refugee, as currently defined by the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Convention”), is someone un-
able to return to his or her country due to a “well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion . . . .”26
Tracing the development of the 1951 Convention and the estab-
lishment of international legal norms demonstrates that individu-
als have a right to seek asylum, derived from nations’ responsibility
to not only refrain from returning them to persecution, but to en-
sure access to their territory and protection mechanisms to justly
consider their claim. For, as stated by leading international law
scholar James Hathaway, “[t]he most urgent need of refugees is to
secure entry into a territory in which they are sheltered from the
risk of being persecuted.”27 Failure to ensure such shelter, in many
circumstances, amounts to a violation of international law in the
same way the deportation of a refugee directly to their country of
origin infringes on the duty of the State to adhere to the core refu-
gee law principle, non-refoulement.28
In 1921, the League of Nations, with the election of Dr.
Fridtjob Nansen as the inaugural High Commissioner for Russian
refugees, first recognized that certain categories of people re-
quired international legal structures to ensure protection.29 The
League of Nations went on to support international protection for
Armenians in 1924 and Turkish refugees in 1928, and in 1933 it
drafted the Convention Relating to the International Status of Ref-
ugees, which recognized the need for the international community
26 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention], https://perma.cc/7FLY-HYFA.
27 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 279
(2005).
28 Id. at 317. Refoulement, taken from French, refers to the return of a person to a
country where they have reason to fear persecution based on a protected ground. See
1951 Convention, supra note 26, at art. 33.
29 See Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y, 129, 130 (2001).
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to protect those fleeing persecution in their homelands.30 On May
13, 1939, nine-hundred and thirty-seven passengers, mostly Jews
fleeing Hitler’s Third Reich, departed Europe on the St. Louis
transatlantic liner following visa petitions made to the United
States.31 The United States did not have a system for evaluating
refugee claims, nor had international law yet established the defini-
tion of a refugee or the various commitments that would later gov-
ern the nation’s evaluation of such claims under binding treaties.32
In 1939, the United States had a quota of 27,370 Germans and Aus-
trians a year that had already been filled by the time the St. Louis
refugees arrived in Cuba to await word from the United States.33
Eventually, the ship was forced to return to Europe. Five-hundred-
and-thirty-two Jewish passengers were trapped in Western Europe
when Hitler invaded – almost half died in the Holocaust.34
In the aftermath of World War II, it was clear the world re-
quired an international legal system to set standards to hold gov-
ernments accountable and codify individual rights beyond those
afforded by any one nation to its peoples. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (“UDHR”), proclaimed by the newly minted
United Nations General Assembly in 1948,35 unequivocally stated
“everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asy-
lum from persecution.”36 An array of additional instruments—
United Nations, regional, and national commitments—have fur-
ther elaborated this concisely declared right and illuminated the
requirements for adequately effectuating this core element of in-
ternational human rights protections.37
The 1951 Convention grew from this global recognition that
30 Id.; see Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28,
1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 3663 [hereinafter Convention of 1933], https://perma.cc/R7R4-
2RSM.
31 Voyage of the St. Louis, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM: HOLOCAUST ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (last visited Dec. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/MBN6-ZJXC.
32 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Protocol Relating to Refugees, supra note
6.
33 Voyage of the St. Louis, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 See U.N. Charter preamble, https://perma.cc/3QHQ-7QMP; G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, art. 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights], https://perma.cc/FFP5-YEXT.
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 35.
37 See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 16a (Ger.), translated at https://
perma.cc/MU9X-DVCN; Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, c. 33 (UK); G.A. Res.
39/46, art. 3, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984); see also Carol Batchelor, The 1954 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Implementation Within the European Union
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prevention of future atrocities required a system to ensure those
seeking protection were afforded “the widest possible exercise of
[their] fundamental rights and freedoms . . . .”38 The 1951 Conven-
tion established the “enduring foundations of refugee protection
by setting baseline principles on which the international protection
of refugees was to be built.”39 These core principles include,
among others:40
• Refugees should not be returned to face persecution or the
threat of persecution–the principle of nonrefoulement;41
• Protection must be extended to all refugees without
discrimination;42
• The problem of refugees is social and humanitarian in na-
ture, and therefore should not become a cause of tension
between states;43
• Persons escaping persecution cannot be expected to leave
their country and enter another country in a regular man-
ner, and accordingly should not be penalized for having en-
tered into, or for being illegally in, the country where they
seek asylum.44
The principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in Article 33 of the
1951 Convention,45 forms the very core of international refugee
law. Yet, cursory examination of the principle may unduly lead
States to the conclusion that such a prohibition is limited to the
removal of those already physically present in the State’s territory.
This presumption is wrong and carries with it devastating conse-
quences.46 Non-refoulement is a rare right that is not predicated on
the arrival of a refugee at a State’s territory, nor on the formal
adjudication of their status.47 In fact, the duty of non-refoulement
prohibits any measure that results in refugees being “pushed back
into the arms of their persecutors,” whether or not the measure in
Member States and Recommendations for Harmonization, REFUGE, Summer 2004, at 31,
https://perma.cc/7TWA-W7YT.
38 1951 Convention, supra note 26, at preamble.
39 Feller, supra note 29, at 131-32.
40 Id.
41 See 1951 Convention, supra note 26, at art. 33.
42 Id. at art. 3.
43 Id. at preamble.
44 See id. at art. 31.
45 Id. at art. 33.
46 See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 280-83 (citing examples of St. Louis during
WWII; Vietnamese pushed back by Thai; Tibetans denied entry to Nepal; turn-back
policies in Africa; Colombians into Venezuela; and, Haitians by the United States); see
also, e.g., CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES & CRISTOSAL, POINT OF NO RETURN: THE FEAR
AND CRIMINALIZATION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES (2017).
47 HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 304.
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question is undertaken by a State against those currently in its terri-
tory.48 A State’s non-refoulement commitment, it can be argued, was
always understood to preclude “non-admittance at its frontiers” as
well as non-return of those within its borders.49
The first codification of the non-refoulement principle, from
which the duty of non-refoulement later enshrined in the 1951 Con-
vention was derived, can be found in the 1933 League of Nations’
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees.50 Arti-
cle 3 of the 1933 Convention described the non-refoulement princi-
ple as a responsibility “not to remove or keep [refugees] from its
territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or
non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement) . . .” and under no cir-
cumstances “refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their coun-
tries of origin.”51
Furthermore, during the negotiation and drafting of the 1951
Convention, delegates expressed the understanding that the core
non-refoulement principle encompassed both non-return and non-
admittance protections.52 Louis Henkin,53 the United States repre-
sentative to the convention drafting conference, explicitly stated:
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refugee
who asked admittance, or of turning him back after he had
crossed the frontier, or even of expelling him after he had been
admitted to residence in the territory, the problem was more or
less the same. Whatever the case might be, whether or not the
refugee was in a regular position, he must not be turned back to
a country where his life or freedom could be threatened.54
In 1977, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed “the
fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of non-
refoulement – both at the border and within the territory of a State –
of persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their
country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been
formally recognized as refugees.”55 In 1980 and 1981, UNHCR con-
48 Id. at 301 (internal quotations omitted) (citing U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 21st mtg.
at ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 (Feb. 2, 1950), https://perma.cc/J7GU-8HAT).
49 Id. at 315.
50 Convention of 1933, supra note 30; HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 315.
51 Convention of 1933 supra note 30, at art. 3 (emphasis added).
52 See U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 21st mtg., U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20 (Feb. 1, 1950)
[hereinafter U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Twentieth
Meeting], https://perma.cc/7539-HPT7.
53 Agnes Hurwitz, UNHCR Mourns Death of an Architect of the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, UNHCR (Oct 19, 2010), https://perma.cc/WRG9-RUGG.
54 U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Twentieth Meeting,
supra note 52.
55 Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
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cluded that, “[i]n all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoule-
ment - including non-rejection at the frontier - must be scrupulously
observed,”56 and, even in “case[s] of large-scale influx, persons
seeking asylum should always receive at least temporary refuge
. . . .”57
Today, legal scholars concur that the obligation of non-refoule-
ment encompasses a prohibition against return “in any manner what-
soever to countries where they may face persecution,”58 that “Article
33(1) is applicable to rejection at the frontier of a potential host
State,”59 and that the concept of non-refoulement “now encompasses
both non-return and non-rejection.”60 Therefore, the analysis re-
quired to determine if a State is in violation of its non-refoulement
obligation turns solely on whether the State action presents any
chance that a denial of protection will result in the return of the
individual to persecution, not whether the individual in question is
in the State’s territory, in transit to the State’s territory, or yet de-
termined to meet the Refugee definition through an adjudicatory
process.61
Furthermore, an array of international law provides migrants
the right to due process.62 The international community under-
stands the right to due process as an important check on limita-
tions to seeking protection,63 a right commonly undercut by
government attempts to stem the number of migrants granted per-
manent status in their country. The right to due process recognizes
gees, U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add.1 (Oct. 31, 1977), https://perma.cc/WUE8-9G9J (em-
phasis added).
56 Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add.1 (Oct. 21, 1981), https://perma.cc/YS37-K4ZY.
57 Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, U.N. Doc. A/35/12/Add.1 (Nov. 3 1980), https://perma.cc/FLZ8-UKWN.
58 Mark R. von Sternberg, Reconfiguring the Law of Non-Refoulement: Procedural and
Substantive Barriers for Those Seeking to Access Surrogate International Human Rights Protec-
tion, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 329, 331 (2014) (quoting GUY S. GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasis in original)).
59 Id. (citing Gregor Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Enter Under Interna-
tional Law, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 542, 549 (2005)).
60 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 58, at 124 (emphasis added).
61 See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 302.
62 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 35, at arts. 10-11; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 14, 16, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 172; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5(a), adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, arts. 12(2), 40(1), adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, open for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5; see also The IMBR Initiative, supra note 25, at 57.
63 See The IMBR Initiative, supra note 25, at 57.
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that access to a State’s territory is of little import if lack of procedu-
ral protections result in refoulement of refugees. As detailed below in
Section II(B)(1) and (2), inadequate screening interviews can re-
sult in the improper return of legitimate refugees. Several instru-
ments have been developed to outline appropriate interviewing
procedures that comply with the 1951 Convention, and protect
against the wrongful refoulement of refugees.64
When combined with States’ non-refoulement obligation, inter-
national law deliberately sets up a legal system aimed at ensuring
all migrants seeking protection are, at a minimum, afforded tem-
porary shelter and adequate adjudication of their protection
claim.65 Only following open receipt and fair consideration of a
person’s asylum claim can a State be sure its actions do not run
afoul of its international legal obligations. In some countries, such
as the United States, these principles have been enshrined in stat-
ute – further recognition of the importance of refraining from
their derogation.
B. Domestic Assurance of Access to Protection Mechanisms
The heart of U.S. asylum law rests in the Refugee Act of 1980
(hereinafter referred to as “the Refugee Act”), which was intended
to bring domestic law into conformity with the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol.66 The United States had acceded to the
Protocol in 1968 and the Refugee Act codified the customs that
had developed in the interim.67 The Refugee Act adopted a defini-
tion of refugee,68 mirroring that in the Protocol, and it enshrined
the right to apply for asylum. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158,
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port
64 See, e.g., U.N.H.C.R., FAIR AND EFFICIENT ASYLUM PROCEDURES: A NON-EXHAUS-
TIVE OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2005), https://perma.cc/
2BL3-VSTM; Global Consultations on International Protection, Agenda for Protection,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/965/Add.1 (June 26, 2002), https://perma.cc/7TK4-LD89; see
also G.A. Res. 51/75, at ¶ 4 (Feb. 12, 1997), https://perma.cc/2BDF-WJPX (urging
States to ensure access, consistent with relevant international and regional instru-
ments, for all asylum-seekers to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of
refugee status and the granting of asylum to eligible persons).
65 See The IMBR Initiative, supra note 25, at 68.
66 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also 1951 Convention, supra note 26;
Protocol Relating to Refugees, supra note 6.
67 See S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 141, 141.
68 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102-03 (1980)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2017)).
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of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United
States after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for
asylum . . .69
Subsequent case law has firmly upheld the right to apply for
asylum.70 However, ensuring meaningful access to the right has
been and continues to be a significant challenge. The current stat-
utory and regulatory framework for applying for asylum at the bor-
der is the result of efforts intended to reduce alleged fraudulent
asylum claims as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).71 Since then, numer-
ous publications have suggested that IIRIRA has done a great deal
of harm to people in need of protection.72 However, the rhetoric
of cracking down on immigration has long been politically expedi-
ent. As such, the current screening process at the border, in prac-
tice, facilitates the rejection of arriving immigrants, including
asylum seekers, as quickly as possible.
1. How Asylum Works at Ports of Entry
To understand this system, it is first important to provide an
overview of how people enter the U.S. asylum system at ports of
entry along the border. Although it might seem obvious, the initial
step of the process is reaching a U.S. port of entry or border. Once
at a port of entry or having crossed the border, certain categories
of inadmissible noncitizens are subject to “expedited removal” pro-
69 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(1) (2017).
70 E.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 982 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc) (affirming that
section 1158 confers upon all aliens the right to apply for asylum), aff’d as modified,
472 U.S. 846 (1985); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038–39 (5th Cir.
1982) (detailing the existence of a statutory right to apply for asylum). But see Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (finding no extraterritorial obli-
gation under the Refugee Convention and Protocol in the case of Haitians inter-
dicted on the high seas).
71 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
72 See generally ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM ADJU-
DICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 41-48 (2014) (discussing the
effect of the one-year filing deadline on meritorious cases); Lindsay M. Harris, The
One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of the Immigration Court Backlog, 2016 WIS. L. REV.,
1185, 1196-1200 (2016); Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be
Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167
(2006); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 117
(2001); US: 20 Years of Immigrant Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 25, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/Y3PG-TZYL.
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ceedings,73 the legacy of IIRIRA.74 In short, expedited removal is a
form of administrative proceeding that authorizes individual CBP
officers to bypass the immigration court system and issue deporta-
tion orders to individuals who arrive at the border without permis-
sion to enter or who are arrested within 100 miles of the border
and within fourteen days of an unauthorized entry.75 While expe-
dited removal was originally limited in use and applied only at
ports of entry,76 it has now dramatically expanded and could be
expanded further.77
However, CBP is required to screen and refer anyone who ex-
presses a fear of returning to his or her country, or intent to apply
for asylum, to the Asylum Office (AO) for a Credible Fear Inter-
view (CFI).78 If an asylum officer then finds that an individual has
established a “significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for
asylum,79 that person will be referred to the immigration court for
a full hearing on the claim before an immigration judge.80 Limits
on meaningful access to counsel, appeals, and oversight at various
stages in this process have been of great concern to advocates and
will be discussed in Section II. These concerns, however, lead to an
important issue: although the United States has a mechanism to
seek asylum at the border, as implemented, this mechanism does
not provide meaningful access to protection mechanisms.
73 Expedited removal cannot be used on returning U.S. citizens, Lawful Perma-
nent Residents, and people with existing refugee or asylee status. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2017). Expedited removal generally applies to people attempting
to enter without a valid visa or suspected of fraud or misrepresentation, or those
within the United States without having been admitted or paroled. Id.
74 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579 to 3009-584 (1996).
75 Until recently, U.S. policy was to limit expedited removal to immigrants who
have been in the United States for less than fourteen days and were within 100 miles
of an international land border. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed.
Reg. 48877, 48880 (2004). Statute permits the use of expedited removal anywhere in
the United States within two years of entry, and President Donald Trump has indi-
cated an intent to use the statute as broadly as possible moving forward. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2009) (limiting expedited removal to those who cannot es-
tablish two years of continuous physical presence); Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note
1.
76 62 Fed. Reg. 10311, 10352 (Mar. 6, 1997).
77 See Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note 1.
78 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B) (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2017).
79 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(3) (2017). A credible fear requires a “significant possibil-
ity” that the individual could establish eligibility for asylum or protection under the
Convention Against Torture. G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984). For
a discussion of this burden and possible changes, see discussion infra Section II.B.2.
80 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2017).
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2. Due Process and the Troubling History of the Plenary
Power Doctrine
Thus, it is important to address that crucial right that gives all
other rights meaning – due process.81 There is great tension be-
tween CBP’s desire to deport people as quickly as possible and the
due process owed to asylum seekers under international, constitu-
tional, and statutory protections. First, as discussed supra, the right
to due process is enshrined in international human rights law.82 A
person’s immigration status does not lessen a government’s duty to
treat an individual with dignity and to adjudicate claims in a man-
ner that preserves fairness and justice. Due process is not a burden;
it is a human right. Second, due process for asylum seekers is re-
quired by the U.S. Constitution; the Fifth Amendment states that
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law . . . .”83
Over time, the U.S. courts have attempted to qualify this pro-
tection, suggesting that “person” does not mean any person. How-
ever, even accepting this proposition in arguendo, it can be argued
that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act pro-
tect the due process rights of asylum seekers, and those rights ex-
tend along the border and at ports of entry. The question of which
categories of immigrants are guaranteed due process according to
U.S. courts is complex.84 Although it is well established that Consti-
81 This paper focuses on due process and the right to petition for asylum. How-
ever, while it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important for advocates to remem-
ber that courts may be more willing to afford constitutional rights to immigrants at
the border in other types of proceedings. For example, it is well established that immi-
grants are entitled to constitutional rights in criminal and property proceedings. See
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (finding that a sentence of impris-
onment and hard labor could not be imposed for the crime of illegal entry into the
United States without a jury trial); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481,489 (1931) (The United States cannot expropriate an alien’s property without
just compensation). The justification often used for distinguishing immigration pro-
ceedings is Congress’ broad powers in controlling admissions at the border, discussed
infra Section I.B.2.
82 “Every migrant has the right to due process of law before the courts, tribunals,
and all other organs and authorities administering justice, as well as those specifically
charged with making status determinations regarding migrants.” The IMBR Initiative,
supra note 25, at 57; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 35;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 62; International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 62; G.A.
Res. 40/144, art. 5(1)(c), Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are
Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (Dec. 13, 1985).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84 See Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right To Seek Asylum in the United States: The
Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303 (2001),
for a discussion of the history of due process and asylum.
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tutional due process extends to deportation hearings,85 the extent
to which due process applies at ports of entry remains unresolved
when it comes to asylum. In some circumstances, those who are
seeking entry into the United States at ports of entry have been
granted less due process than those who have already entered the
country. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950 stated,
“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due pro-
cess as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”86 This line of
case law is so bafflingly at odds with the rule of law that immigra-
tion law scholar T. Alexander Aleinikoff once opened an article
discussing the 1950 decision with the line, “Occasionally, the Su-
preme Court makes a statement about the Constitution that simply
cannot be true.”87 The idea that Congress can limit due process
however it likes for those seeking entry, has in part been justified
by the premise that admission to the country is a privilege not a
right and the federal government has plenary power over who en-
ters the country.88 After a long period asserting the plenary power
of Congress over immigration law, often tinged with discriminatory
undertones,89 courts began to suggest that due process may attach
in circumstances where there is a liberty or property interest.90
Then, Congress largely reset the rules with the creation of expe-
85 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33, 50–51, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950) (“A deportation hearing involves
issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to
which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as
measuring up to constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for depor-
tation proceedings the like of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even
where less vital matters of property rights are at stake.”).
86 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
87 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and  ‘Community Ties’: A Response to
Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 237 (1983).
88 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542;
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892)).
89 See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 210 (1953). See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Asian Americans Advanc-
ing Justice in Support of Respondents, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S.Ct. 2489 (No. 15-
1204), for a general overview of the controversial and racially charged history of ple-
nary power doctrine.
90 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001) (citing cases establishing the right to
habeas corpus at ports of entry); Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999);
Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1994); Maldonado-Perez v. I.N.S., 865 F.2d
328, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1984); Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982) (noting that courts should not impose specific
procedures, but may assess whether the minimum requirements of procedure have
been met at ports of entry for returning immigrants); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith,
676 F.2d 1023, 1034-38 (5th Cir. 1982).
2017] VANISHING PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE 107
dited removal and a new procedural framework in 1996.91
Since then, legal challenges have been stymied by restrictions
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)-(3). Congress included a provi-
sion in IIRIRA stating that any challenges to the expedited removal
statute and regulations must be brought within the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia within sixty days of im-
plementation.92 In the case of the original statute, this means the
deadline was May 31, 1997. Despite advocates rushing to challenge
the law within this time frame, the brief window made it difficult to
find plaintiffs with standing on asylum matters. The D.C. Circuit
abided by the sixty-day time limit as a jurisdictional restriction, not-
ing that the questions of due process for asylum-seekers would not
be reached on the merits due to a lack of third-party standing.93
This created an absurd result: challenges that did not conveniently
manifest themselves during a 60-day window in 1997 have been dif-
ficult to raise twenty years later absent any future regulatory
changes which would permit a renewed challenge on the validity of
the system.94 This jurisdictional problem has largely shifted the
conversation into the realm of challenges regarding failure to com-
ply with those procedures outlined in the statute and regulations,
as well as cases involving habeas corpus,95 a writ that can be used to
challenge the legality of an arrest or detention before a judge. In
this context, recent case law addressing the plenary power doctrine
has not been favorable for asylum seekers. In 2016, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit accepted the plenary power doctrine
as a foregone conclusion and summarily found that admission is a
privilege in the context of asylum.96 In Castro v. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, the court determined that the Suspension
Clause, which states that the writ of habeas corpus may only be
suspended in times of rebellion or invasion,97 did not apply to asy-
lum seekers who have not been legally admitted into the United
91 See supra note 74.
92 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(B) (2017).
93 Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
94 But see Delgado-Arteaga v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that
the petitioner suffered injury in fact when he was denied opportunity to apply for
asylum on basis that he was subject to reinstated order for his removal, and thus had
standing to challenge statute preventing him from applying for asylum on that basis).
95 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
96 See generally Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
Prior to Castro, the Third Circuit had found that asylum safeguards were necessary for
due process, although with a statutory as opposed to constitutional basis. See Chi Thon
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999); Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F. 3d 195, 203 (3d
Cir. 1996).
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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States, even when they are already on U.S. soil.98 This decision was
a substantial departure from precedent.99 Immigration law often
distinguishes between those who have legally been admitted into
the country and those who have physically entered the country for
purposes of determining eligibility for immigration benefits, relief,
removability, and criminal prosecution for illegal entry. Castro,
however, conflates legal admission with attachment of constitu-
tional rights. Previously, the Supreme Court has stated that nonci-
tizens in the United States have a right to habeas corpus regardless
of their status, and even sometimes outside the United States.100
Castro tried to circumvent this by saying that there is a difference
between noncitizens without status and those who are lawful per-
manent residents, but this inherently implies that the court is en-
gaging in some sort of balancing of interests in determining which
immigrants merit habeas without making a full analysis of the inter-
ests of asylum seekers. Furthermore, the two cases that Castro most
relies upon, as examples of people denied rights because they had
not made a legal entry, both involved exclusion based on specific
national security concerns, distinguishing them from ordinary
noncitizens at ports of entry and along the border.101
3. Defending Due Process in the Context of Asylum
Thus, the debate arrives at the ultimate issue: The Supreme
98 Castro, 835 F.3d 553.
99 Although Castro relied on two Supreme Court cases regarding the “commitment
to the full breadth of the plenary power doctrine,” it neglected to address that one of
these cases distinguished illegal entries as entries and that both cases involved exclu-
sion on national security grounds. See Castro 835 F.3d at 443 (citing United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). But see Mezei 345 U.S. at 212 (“It is true that
aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only
after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law.”). More recent Supreme Court precedent has expanded on this dis-
tinction. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (finding that noncitizens
detained at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to habeas corpus);  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (“Once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or perma-
nent.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens
within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
100 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-01, 305-306 (2001).
101 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216 (“An exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the
national security, however, presents different considerations.”); Knauff, 338 U.S. at
540 (addressing the use of habeas corpus to challenge the Attorney General’s right to
exclude petitioner for security reasons without a hearing).
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Court has never reached the question of due process or habeas
corpus for asylum seekers at ports of entry. Castro concluded that
asylum seekers who have not been admitted to the United States
have no constitutional rights on the assumption that the plenary
power is absolute for arriving noncitizens without analyzing any of
the special circumstances associated with asylum. As such, it is
worth taking a fresh look at due process at ports of entry, especially
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent denial of the petition for
writ of certiorari to review Castro.102
However, before diving into arguments supporting due pro-
cess for asylum seekers, it is important to pause and remember that
international law and the U.S. Constitution protect the due process
rights of all people by virtue of their humanity, and the efforts of
U.S. jurisprudence to create categories of people who are not guar-
anteed full protection under the law is a violation of human rights
and an attack on the rule of law.103 Therefore, while it is necessary
to advocate for due process within the domestic legal framework, it
is important to recall that ultimately the courts should be pushed
to extend due process to all people regardless of their immigration
status.
In the context of domestic law, the Supreme Court has never
reached the issue of due process for asylum seekers at ports of en-
try, and the privilege-versus-right and plenary power argument
does not hold up in the context of asylum. There is a statutory right
to apply for asylum and that right explicitly applies at ports of entry
and regardless of immigration status.104 This right constitutes a
substantial liberty interest, triggering the attachment of due pro-
cess rights.105 The question of asylum as a liberty interest similarly
has never landed squarely before the Supreme Court.106 In Jean v.
Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit found that asylum seekers have no lib-
102 Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017).
103 See The IMBR Initiative, supra note 25; see also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights supra note 35; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supra note
63; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion supra note 62; G.A. Res. 40/144, art. 5(1)(c), Declaration on the Human Rights
of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (Dec. 13,
1985).
104 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2017).
105 See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. 1982); Orantes-
Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1504 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-
Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 957 (11th Cir.1984) (distinguishing which types of statutory provisions re-
garding immigrants to which due process attaches).
106 See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 855 (1985) (choosing to rely on statutory inter-
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erty interest because asylum is discretionary and there is only a
right to apply, not to asylum itself, and the First Circuit has come to
a similar conclusion.107 However, it is inaccurate to state that the
law only provides discretionary relief. U.S. immigration law in-
cludes nondiscretionary relief in the form of withholding of re-
moval and protection under the Convention Against Torture for
those who may not be eligible for asylum, but who would more
likely than not face persecution or torture if returned to their
country of origin.108  Furthermore, as explained by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the right to petition in the case of asylum must qualify as a
liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke due process if asy-
lum is to have any meaning at all.109 The Ninth Circuit also has at
least found some circumstances where an asylum seeker at the bor-
der would be entitled to due process safeguards.110 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit noted that there can hardly be any greater liberty
interest than escape from persecution and possible death.111
Under U.S. law, the courts should weigh the private interest at
stake, the likelihood of error, and the government’s interest to de-
termine the level of process due pursuant to the balancing test es-
tablished in Mathews v. Eldridge.112 First, in the case of asylum, the
private interest is uniquely powerful – a liberty interest tied to a
right to petition combined with a liberty interest based on the
threat to life and security that is intrinsic in asylum claims. Second,
the likelihood of error in the absence of due process is high and
well-documented.113 People escaping persecution have suffered se-
pretation in order to avoid the constitutional due process and equal protection
questions).
107 See Jean, 727 F.2d at 981–82 (“[T]he Refugee Act does not create an entitlement
to asylum.”); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
108 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d), 1208.16, 1208.17,
1208.18 (2017); see also Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1032 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
a noncitizen denied asylum as a matter of discretion remains eligible for
withholding).
109 Haitian Refugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1039.
110 In reviewing the treatment of Salvadorans seeking asylum in the United States,
the Ninth Circuit upheld a judge’s finding that one “cannot overstate the dire conse-
quences attending an erroneous deprivation of these rights. Removal to a country
overrun with civil war, violence, and government-sanctioned terrorist organizations
may lead to the most serious of deprivations.” Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.
Supp. 1488, 1504 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh,
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
111 Id.
112 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
113 See, e.g., CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18; ACLU, supra note 18; AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 9-10; Joshua Partlow, U.S. Border Officials Are Illegally Turn-
ing Away Asylum Seekers, Critics Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/
BSJ6-ZNKS.
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vere trauma, often distrust authority figures because of past abuse,
have had very little time to prepare their cases given the urgency of
their flight, and are seldom well-educated in the intricacies of asy-
lum law.114 For example, a gay man raped and tortured by uni-
formed police officers in his home country because of his sexual
orientation may be hesitant to present the details of his life story to
an imposing, uniformed stranger at the U.S. border without sub-
stantial safeguards in place. Furthermore, unlike a court, border
officers are ill-equipped, and, in fact, not allowed to deal with the
complex factual and legal determinations that are central to asy-
lum claims.115 Third, while the government interest in controlling
admissions into the country is well established, that control still
must comport with the rule of law.116
Furthermore, border control is not the government’s sole in-
terest. The United States has a substantial humanitarian interest in
ensuring the protection of asylum seekers, and the 1967 Protocol
and the Refugee Act of 1980 are at their hearts a categorical decla-
ration that this humanitarian interest is more important than ordi-
nary immigration controls.  While the government often cites its
interest in preventing crime, terrorism, and fraud, as reasons to
maintain tight controls over border security, the INA addresses
these issues in the asylum adjudication process. Thus, granting asy-
lum seekers due process does not threaten these government
interests.
Therefore, the balancing test shows a strong liberty interest, a
high risk of error, and a strong government interest in, not against,
due process. As such, asylum seekers merit substantial due process
even under this test.117
114 See Declaration of Stuart L. Lustig, M.D., M.P.H., on behalf of the Center for
Gender & Refugee Studies, University of California Hastings College of the Law (Mar.
2, 2017) (on file with the CUNY Law Review).
115 8. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2017) (stating that immigration officers must re-
fer asylum seekers to an interview conducted by an asylum officer).
116 “Although the Executive and Legislative branches have the power to make for-
eign policy determinations, it is the responsibility of this Court to ensure that the due
process rights of persons within the United States are respected.”
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1503 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). See Lenni B
Benson, Immigration Adjudication: The Missing “Rule of Law,” 5 J. MIGR. & HUM. SEC.
331 (2017), for an interesting discussion of the hallmarks of justice and rule of law
and their absence in the U.S. immigration system.
117 It is also worth noting that separate from a general right to due process, the
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 6, 60 Stat. 237, 240 (1946), argua-
bly creates a statutory right to counsel for persons “compelled to appear in person
before an agency or representative” of the government, including the Department of
Homeland Security. See also Emily Creighton & Robert Pauw, Right to Counsel Before
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In addition, courts have carved out distinctions between chal-
lenging the practical application of the expedited removal process
to asylum seekers as opposed to the statute itself. This is an area
that remains ripe for litigation and advocacy.118 As noted by the
Eleventh Circuit, “the existence of this protected right to apply for
asylum bars government officials from adopting policies that con-
flict with the terms of the statute, applicable regulations, and their
own announced operating procedures.”119 For example, despite re-
peated challenges over more than two decades, the Ninth Circuit
has upheld a permanent injunction setting out specific procedures
for immigration officers to screen Salvadoran immigrants for po-
tential asylum claims, finding that modern procedures had not
cured the original concerns about abuse.120 In the initial decision
in 1982, a district judge found that Salvadorans with legitimate asy-
lum claims were being summarily removed from the United States
through coercion, misrepresentation, and misunderstanding.121
The judge also noted that the design of the interview process
worked against asylum seekers because they were likely to be hesi-
tant to share their trauma with a uniformed U.S. official when they
were aware that the U.S. government supported the Salvadoran
government that had been complicit in their persecution.122 As
such, the court ruled that due process required notice, access to
counsel, and other safeguards. Furthermore, in later challenges by
the government, the Ninth Circuit found that this ruling still ap-
plied under the expedited removal regime.123 The plenary power
doctrine is not invulnerable.
DHS, 32ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION LAW UPDATE SOUTH BEACH, 2011 Edition, https://
perma.cc/W4SW-VUHD.
118 Litigation challenging the use of expedited removal at the Artesia family deten-
tion center to deny asylum seekers a meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum was
voluntarily dismissed after the facility closed. See Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismis-
sal, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437-ABJ (D.D.C. voluntarily dismissed Jan. 30,
2015).
119 Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir.1984)
120 Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 321 F. App’x 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2009) (uphold-
ing denial of motion to dissolve the injunction); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.
Supp. 1488, 1504 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh,
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
121 See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 372-74 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
122 Id. at 373, n. 25. The Court states that the evidence before them establishes that
Salvadorans are often frightened and confused at the time of their arrest and interro-
gation, and points to language barriers and general misunderstanding of the court
system. Id at 373.
123 Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 321 F. App’x 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2009) (uphold-
ing denial of motion to dissolve the injunction).
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4. Considerations for Advocates
Thus, while jurisdictional regulations and some recent case
law have sought to limit rights, advocates should remain aggressive
in their efforts to challenge both laws and practices that limit ac-
cess to asylum. As the new administration considers changes to the
expedited removal process, advocates should vigilantly watch for
new regulations that restart the clock for jurisdiction, potentially
providing openings to challenges based on overarching constitu-
tional grounds. This is especially true if the administration expands
expedited removal to encompass any noncitizen anywhere in the
United States who has been present for fewer than two years with-
out having been admitted or paroled into the United States.124
Such changes would only strengthen the argument that due pro-
cess applies to all asylum seekers. It is far harder to argue that a
family living in the heartland of the United States for more than a
year does not have substantial property and liberty interests justify-
ing the attachment of due process. Also, an expanded expedited
removal program would need sufficient due process to ensure that
it is not inadvertently sweeping up citizens and lawful residents.125
Furthermore, even without any changes in the system, there is
plenty of work to be done in pushing the courts toward full recog-
nition of due process. As the world’s view of individual rights has
expanded, the plenary power doctrine has increasingly left a bad
taste in the mouth of those who utter the phrase to justify the cal-
lous mistreatment of immigrants. Indeed, it is of note that instead
of arguing that the plenary power doctrine is a blank check to dis-
criminate in immigration, the Trump Administration has gone to
great lengths to defend its Muslim “travel ban” as constitutional
through other means.126
Ultimately, without due process, including notice of the right
to seek asylum, a full and fair hearing, and access to counsel, the
United States cannot fulfill its obligation to ensure it does not re-
turn people to persecution.
124 See textual footnote, supra note 75.
125 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 18 (documenting examples of U.S. citizens errone-
ously deported under expedited removal, including the deportation of people with
mental disabilities).
126 See Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary Power?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 14, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://perma.cc/6YNR-DA48.
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II. LIMITING ACCESS TO PROTECTION AT THE U.S. - MEXICO
BORDER
As detailed in Section I, the United States is obligated, under
both domestic and international law, to respect the principle of
non-refoulement, as defined to preclude any measure that may result
in refugees being “pushed back into the arms of their persecu-
tors.”127 Yet, meaningful access to asylum in the United States is
under threat at many levels: before reaching the border, at the bor-
der, and even while proceedings are pending. In an effort to re-
duce migration, the United States is at risk of sacrificing careful
review of humanitarian claims in the name of speed. It is important
to remember that speed and convenience are not the same as effi-
ciency; efficiency implies some level of accuracy. Efforts to more
quickly exclude those who ultimately might be ordered removed
jeopardizes those with legitimate claims – a substantial number.
From 2005 to 2015, the United State granted an average of 24,397
asylum cases a year.128 Also, although asylum is just one of many
types of immigration relief raised in removal proceedings, there
are even more asylum claims awaiting adjudication amidst the
more than half a million removal cases pending in the immigration
court system’s backlogs.129 It is not “efficient” to prioritize exclud-
ing those who may not be eligible at the expense of those who are.
Rather, efforts should focus on fully assessing claims to make sure
that decisions on eligibility are not made rashly. In addition, even
those claims that are ultimately denied in immigration court
should not be conflated with fraud. Asylum law is complex and full
of unsettled areas of law, and families may have genuine fears of
persecution worth adjudicating even if they are ultimately unable
to meet their burden or to fit their case within a legal theory. A
failed claim is not the same as a frivolous claim.130
Keeping the importance of meaningful access to the right to
asylum in mind, this section will discuss several actual and pro-
posed obstacles to asylum at the border: barriers to physically ap-
127 See HATHAWAY, supra  note 27, at 301.
128 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2015 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 43
(2016), https://perma.cc/5V92-GVAM.
129 See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION (last visited Dec. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/Z3L6-EQ8V (showing a total of 650,411 pending immigration
court cases as of October 2017).
130 “Frivolous” is a term of art in immigration law. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2017)
(“[A]n asylum application is frivolous if any of its material elements is deliberately
fabricated.”). If an immigration judge makes a finding that an applicant knowingly
made a frivolous claim, that immigrant is permanently barred from any immigration
benefit, including asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2017).
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proaching the border, procedural and practical limits on due
process at the border, and proposals to return asylum seekers to
Mexico while proceedings are pending.
A. Access to the Border: Border Externalization Undermines the Right
to Asylum
The world faces historic numbers of people moving across in-
ternational borders, driven by political unrest, conflict, climate
change, globalization, and other factors.131 This increase in migra-
tion has also coincided with rising xenophobia in many countries
and efforts to reduce both legal and illegal immigration.132 Public
conversation often focuses on dramatic gestures like President
Trump’s proposed wall,133 or increases in deportation.134 However,
countries increasingly have attempted to quietly divert asylum seek-
ers by stopping people long before they reach a border or port of
entry.135
1. When States Conspire to Keep Migrants at a Distance
State efforts to prevent people from reaching their territories,
collectively referred to as “border externalization,” are not novel
tactics. Systems to stop migration flows have often been justified as
131 As of 2015, there were an estimated 244 million international migrants in the
world, up from 173 million in 2000. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION RE-
PORT 2015 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/7G2B-CF8Z. About 54 million immigrants
were hosted in North America, lower than in Europe and Asia. Id. However, the single
largest host country was the United States with 47 million immigrants or about one in
every five migrants in the world. Id. Meanwhile, UNHCR estimates that there are now
65.6 million forcibly displaced people worldwide and 22.5 million refugees. UNHCR,
GLOBAL TRENDS 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/GS6M-GDHN.
132 The world has seen a sharp increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in recent
years, and governments have not sufficiently addressed it, according to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD, International Migration
Outlook 2016 7-8 (2016), https://perma.cc/Z92G-SEVD; see also Bill Frelick, Dis-
patches: Tone Down the Scaremongering Over Migrants, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 10, 2015,
10:32 PM), https://perma.cc/W6PT-NNKD.
133 Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note 1 (“It is the policy of the executive branch to
(a) secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construc-
tion of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate
personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts
of terrorism . . . .”).
134 Under the Obama administration, the United States saw a dramatic increase in
deportations. From 2006 to 2015, just over 3.7 million people were removed from the
United States, compared with roughly 1.8 million in the previous ten years. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 128, at 103.
135 See Bill Frelick et al., The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights
of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. MIGR. & HUM. SEC. 190 (2016), for a general
overview of border externalization in the context of international law.
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efforts to ensure national security, to prevent migrants from mak-
ing dangerous journeys, to crack down on international human
trafficking enterprises, and to aid transit countries in developing
their own migration controls.136 The extent to which border exter-
nalization serves these purposes has always been questionable.
Turning away a mother and child less than a mile from the U.S-
Mexican border does little to promote any of these goals. Rather,
being turned away is likely to make families consider dangerous,
desperate, and irregular options for entering the United States.137
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the question is not
whether the United States will be required to admit every person
arriving at the border, but merely whether the nation will provide
them with a meaningful opportunity to seek humanitarian protec-
tion. Despite these limitations, border externalization appears to
be growing increasingly bold and increasingly difficult to justify as
anything beyond an effort to escape obligations to provide humani-
tarian protection.
Unfortunately, U.S. courts upheld border externalization in
the infamous case of the interdiction on the high seas of Haitian
asylum seekers.138 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., Justice
John Paul Stevens stretched semantics to hold that there is no ex-
traterritorial obligation under the Refugee Convention and Proto-
col.139 Despite the Convention clearly stating that “[n]o
contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened,” Stevens found that no return
“whatsoever” “in any manner” was designed to be read narrowly
and must refer only to the return of people already in the United
136 See Home and Away: DHS and the Threats to America, Remarks Delivered by Secretary
Kelly at George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Apr.18, 2017), https://perma.cc/KBP2-3G8N.
137 See, e.g., Paulina Villegas & Randal C. Archibold, Mexico Makes Route Tougher for
Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014, http://perma.cc/J6XL-SMC7; Aaron Nelsen &
Julysa Sosa, Mexico: Mothers Searching for Life on Roads of Death, PULITZER CTR. (Dec. 18,
2016), https://perma.cc/RKZ8-R63T; Nina Lakhani, Central American Migrants Desper-
ate to Reach US Risk New Dangers at Sea, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://
perma.cc/6DWT-9U9S.
138 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (“In sum, all
available evidence about the meaning of § 243(h)—the government official at whom
it is directed, its location in the Act, its failure to suggest any extraterritorial applica-
tion, the 1980 amendment that gave it a dual reference to “deport or return,” and the
relevance of that dual structure to immigration law in general—leads unerringly to
the conclusion that it applies in only one context: the domestic procedures by which
the Attorney General determines whether deportable and excludable aliens may re-
main in the United States.”).
139 Id. at 180-83.
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States.140 He latched onto half of a generic French translation of
the term “refoulement,” ignoring that the French and Belgian dele-
gates involved in the formation of the Convention, presumably
comfortable with their own language and a concept originating
from their countries, had made it clear that as a legal term of art
“refoulement” included efforts to trap people outside a State.141
Furthermore, Stevens’ interpretation makes the Convention’s use
of the phrasing “expel or return,” rather than just “expel,” redun-
dant. Stevens suggested that the drafters of the Convention may
simply have never contemplated the idea of States keeping asylum
seekers from their borders,142 ignoring the fact that the Conven-
tion was a product of World War II and countries like the United
States having done exactly that. In Sale, the United States invited
destination States to close their doors, and UNHCR and interna-
tional rulings condemned the decision.143 Now, as the United
States pushes its virtual border further and further out from its
physical border, advocates should consider new attempts to over-
turn Sale. Otherwise, the Convention has little point unless it was
meant to reward slipping into the country without inspection or
based on false pretenses.
Border externalization can take many forms, including in-
terdiction, visa regimes, or agreements directing third parties to
block movement through transit countries. When the U.S. Coast
Guard intercepted hundreds of thousands of Haitians fleeing the
violent fallout of a 1990 political coup, later detaining many of
them in Guantanamo Bay, that was border externalization.144
When the United States sent the Coast Guard to stop any of the
930 primarily Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany aboard the St.
Louis from swimming ashore, that was border externalization.145
When airlines are required to screen passengers to prevent Syrians
from boarding flights headed to the United States, that is border
140 Id. at 188, 191.
141 U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶¶ 12-15, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 (Feb. 2,
1950), https://perma.cc/J7GU-8HAT.
142 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993).
143 See Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 57; Regina v. Immigration Officer at
Prague Airport [2005] 1 A11 Eng. Rep. 527 (appeal taken from [2003] 4 All Eng.
Rep. 247) (UK); Decision of the Commission as to the Merits of, Case 10.675, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H. R., Report No. 51/96 (1997).
144 Haitian interdiction schemes go back much further to a 1981 agreement be-
tween Haiti and the United States. Interdiction Agreement Between the United States
of America and Haiti, Haiti-U.S., Sept. 23, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3559-60.
145 See RICHARD BREITMAN & ALAN M. KRAUT, AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY AND EURO-
PEAN JEWRY, 1933-1943, 70-73 (1987); see also Tara Magner, A Less Than ‘Pacific’ Solution
for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT. J. REFUGEE LAW 53 (2004).
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externalization.146
Border externalization is a longstanding, inglorious tradition,
and the externalization of the U.S.-Mexico border is no exception.
As early as 1989, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
sought Mexican and Central American cooperation in reducing
immigration through the interception and deportation of people
heading north.147 American policy makers have sought to turn
Mexico into a buffer in hopes that Mexico’s 500-mile southern bor-
der could be an easier defensive position than the 2,000-mile U.S.-
Mexico border. In 2008, the U.S. Congress appropriated almost
$2.8 billion for the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral agreement meant
to improve security in Mexico, including the creation of a twenty-
first century border structure with increased security at Mexico’s
southern border and efforts to interdict people traveling north
with increased patrols and checkpoints along known migration
routes.148 These programs have been widely criticized by human
rights advocates for not sufficiently protecting migrants and refu-
gees’ rights and failing to screen for those in need of protection.149
These campaigns to discourage further immigration appear to
have largely failed with tens of thousands of immigrants still mak-
ing the journey every year.150 Ten of thousands of others have been
146 See Victoria Bryan & Alexander Cornwell, Airlines Complain of Confusion, Costs of
U.S. Immigration Order, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://perma.cc/GH72-
8LN4; see also Exec. Order No. 13780, supra note 1 (limiting entry to the United States
for nationals of Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen); 49 U.S.C. § 44901
(2017) (requiring the Transportation Security Administration to oversee passenger
screening).
147 Bill Frelick, Running the Gauntlet: The Central American Journey through Mexico, 3
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 208, 208-09 (1991).
148 See U.S. EMBASSY - MEXICO, THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE - AN OVERVIEW (2014), https:/
/perma.cc/P9W3-VWNU; CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41349, U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BE-
YOND (2017), https://perma.cc/R7L3-AWZ2.
149 See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41349,
U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 29 (2017)
(“Human rights conditions in Mexico, as well as compliance with conditions on Mé-
rida assistance, are also likely to continue to be important oversight issues. Along with
consideration of providing funds to help secure Mexico’s southern border, Congress
may consider how to help mitigate concerns about migrants’ rights in Mexico.”); CTR.
FOR MIGRATION STUDIES & CRISTOSAL, supra note 46; JESUIT CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.
& CAN. & WASH. OFFICE OF LATIN AM., U.S. SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FOR INTERDIC-
TIONS, INTERCEPTIONS, AND BORDER SECURITY MEASURES IN MEXICO, HONDURAS, AND
GUATEMALA UNDERMINE ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (2014) (presenting
written testimony to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), https://per
ma.cc/LN6W-P7GX.
150 See Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refugee
Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children at the
US-Mexico Border, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 137, 138-39 (2017); see also
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subjected to abuses and violations at the hands of government offi-
cials in the region.151
Deterrence plans ignore the reality that for many people the
dire circumstances in their country of origin are far worse than the
perilous journey north. Essentially, people are trapped in a burn-
ing house, and the United States is hoping that locking the front
door will discourage them from trying to escape the flames. Until
the root humanitarian crises are addressed, forced migration will
continue.
Increasingly, people who have reached northern Mexico face
additional barriers when approaching the U.S. border.152 While
the Trump Administration’s stated objective of turning immigrants
back into Mexico while they await U.S. adjudication of their cases is
still taking shape,153 reports indicate asylum seekers are already fac-
ing challenges near the U.S. border.154 Indeed, many such barriers
were already in place under the Obama administration.155 Barriers
include the use of Mexican officials or private contractors to patrol
the Mexican side of the border and to pre-screen people for valid
entry documents before they are permitted to approach a port of
entry.156 One port adopted an appointment system where asylum
David Nakamura, Flow of Central Americans to U.S. Surging, Expected to Exceed 2014 Num-
bers, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), http://perma.cc/3ZT6-V2VD. While very early
signs showed a decrease in border apprehensions in the month after Trump’s inaugu-
ration, it is difficult to know whether this will have any long-term effect. Nicholas
Kulish & Fernanda Santos, Illegal Border Crossings Appear to Drop Under Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), http://perma.cc/K4FR-P64C. It also is worth noting that a de-
crease in apprehensions does not necessarily mean that there are fewer people in
need of protection.
151 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19; CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES & CRISTOSAL,
supra note 46; see also AMNESTY INT’L, HOME SWEET HOME? HONDURAS, GUATEMALA AND
EL SALVADOR’S ROLE IN A DEEPENING REFUGEE CRISIS (2016), https://perma.cc/2GKB-
4ES9.
152 See Letter from Jamil Dakwar, Director, Human Rights Program, ACLU, et al., to
Paolo Abrão, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://perma.cc/RYK6-WMH6.
153 See Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note 1; Kelly, Implementing, supra note 1.
154 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST supra note 19; see also Letter
from Jamil Dakwar, Director, Human Rights Program, ACLU, et al., to Paolo Abrão,
Exec. Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights (Jan. 15, 2017).
155 See, e.g., Abuse By Private Security Agents at U.S.-Mexico Border Denounced, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 6, 2013, 5:03 PM), https://perma.cc/A8SF-8PR7.
156 Roque Planas & Elise Foley, Trump Officials Credit Him For Fewer Border Crossings.
It’s Not That Simple., HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2017, 8:43 PM), https://perma.cc/
6QC9-3253 (noting that private security guards and CBP agents have more recently
directed migrants toward a Mexican branch of the immigration system called Grupos
Beta, such practices appear to be becoming more common); see also Partlow, supra
note 113 (noting the story of a Guatemalan ex-police officer who approached U.S.
private security guards and explicitly stated that he had survived two attemps on his
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seekers approach Mexican officials to obtain a date and time to
present themselves to U.S. authorities at the port of entry.157 Mean-
while, at other ports of entry, asylum seekers have stated that U.S.
and Mexican officials have stopped them from approaching the
port of entry because they had improper documentation, the port
holding cells were full, there was no asylum available, or simply
that United States officials would be upset if patrols let them ap-
proach the border.158
These practices are deeply concerning because they run
against the humanitarian spirit of asylum law and ultimately dimin-
ish access to asylum worldwide. If countries able to offer protection
collectively close their doors, access to asylum ceases to exist. In-
deed, if the United States seeks to help Mexico refoule these people
to the countries from which they have fled, the United States is
responsible for refoulement.159
Furthermore, beyond the right to seek asylum, these externali-
zation regimes endanger other rights, especially in the case of vul-
nerable migrants. The movement of people should never be
thought of solely as a matter of immigration and refugee law. Each
individual is owed the full spectrum of human rights, regardless of
his or her location by the simple fact of his or her humanity.160
Women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups of mi-
grants may be owed additional rights by virtue of their special legal
status under international law.161 For example, the fundamental
life, but was told to seek out Mexican immigration officials who summarily refused to
assist him).
157 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19; Sandra Dibble, Immigration Appointments
Renewed for Haitians at San Ysidro, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2016, 10:10 PM),
http://perma.cc/7H96-R9RZ; see also Eliot Spagat, Haitians Mass at US-Mexico Border
Despite Deportation Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/9FRG-
RH2M.
158 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST supra note 19; BORDERLAND IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, DIS-
CRETION TO DENY (2017), https://perma.cc/FBS9-T9Q6; see also Letter from Ameri-
can Immigration Council, supra note 19.
159 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, at 160, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) https://perma.cc/NE6C-4WE3 (“A State which directs and con-
trols another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter
is internationally responsible for that act if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would  be  inter-
nationally wrongful  if committed by that State.”).
160 See The IMBR Initiative, supra note 25; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 35, at preamble (“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”).
161 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 62 (although the United
States remains the only State not to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
it is still obligated not to undermine the treaty as a signatory); International Conven-
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principle that should be applied when dealing with a child is the
best interests of the child.162 Single-minded deportation from Mex-
ico to the south neglects the question of what it means to deport
children from Mexico to a country where they have no parents
when they are attempting to reunify with family in the United
States.163 In addition, the militarization of immigration often cre-
ates situations that are inappropriate for children, and children
should never be subject to the substantial harm that can be caused
by detention.164  Circumstances that arise during migration may in-
crease an individual’s vulnerability and call for a proportional in-
crease in State protections. For example, special precautions
should be taken to protect the victims of human trafficking instead
of criminalizing their trauma. As these examples illustrate, the
United States cannot ignore the other rights that are implicated
when it engages in border externalization.
2. Considerations for Advocates
Advocates should seek to hold the U.S. and regional govern-
ments accountable for rights violations and for undermining access
to asylum. For this reason, it is important for advocates to think not
just about the border, but about Mexico and other transit States.
Building relationships with Mexican counterparts and helping de-
tion on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disa-
bilities, adopted Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (as a signatory, the United States is
obligated not to undermine the treaty); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13.
162 “The ultimate aim in addressing the fate of unaccompanied or separated chil-
dren is to identify a durable solution that addresses all their protection needs, takes
into account the child’s view and, wherever possible, leads to overcoming the situa-
tion of a child being unaccompanied or separated.” Comm. on the Rights of the
Child, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Chil-
dren Outside Their Country of Origin on Its Thirty-Ninth Session, ¶¶ 1, 79, U.N. Doc.
CRC/GC/2005/6 (2005), https://perma.cc/2GN8-UYT5.
163 According to Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights, 38 percent of
unaccompanied children encountered by Mexican authorities are seeking to reunite
with relatives in the United States. See COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMA-
NOS MEXICO, https://perma.cc/EZ5F-Y4VM.
164 See Jorge Bustamante (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants),
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/7 (May 14, 2009),
https://perma.cc/CPA5-BHWN; U.N. Secretary-General, Note to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/64/213 (Aug. 3, 2009), https://perma.cc/3AZC-WQBA; see also INT’L
DET. COAL., CAPTURED CHILDHOOD 58-95 (2012), https://perma.cc/7G4F-Y5WW;
Brief of Amici Curiae Youth Advocacy Organizations in Support of Jenny Lisette Flo-
res, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Flores v. Sessions, No. 17-55208, 2017 WL 957660 (9th
Cir. July 5, 2017).
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velop resources in Mexico will better ensure that asylum seekers
have access to meaningful protection. Also, support for immigra-
tion control programs should be conditioned on the development
of, training in, and compliance with better humanitarian screening
mechanisms. As the United States, abdicates leadership in protect-
ing migrants’ rights, advocates also should encourage other States
in the region to step up to promote positive norms in the Ameri-
cas. Moreover, government leaders and officers must constantly be
reminded of the human toll and inappropriateness of externaliza-
tion policies.165
B. Applying for Protection at Ports of Entry: Efforts to Quickly Remove
or Bar Immigrants Create Barriers to Meaningful Access
1. Screening by Customs and Border Protection
For those who make it to a port of entry, the next step is for
asylum seekers to present themselves to a CBP officer for referral
to a protection screening or directly to asylum proceedings.166 This
is made challenging by the degree to which it depends on CBP
officers, with little oversight, to identify and refer asylum seekers to
credible fear interviews. CBP’s role is to flag potential asylum seek-
ers, not to assess the merits of a claim.167 Both statute and regula-
165 In response to an executive order seeking to limit the flow of refugees, UNHCR
reminded the United States: “Americans have long played a crucial role in promoting
global stability while simultaneously exemplifying the highest humanitarian ideals,
from support for refugee emergencies overseas, to welcoming some of the most vul-
nerable refugee families in the United States to rebuild their lives in safety, freedom
and dignity. This is the gold standard in refugee protection and a powerful model for
all countries. At a time of record-high levels of forced human displacement, this kind
of humane leadership is needed more than ever.” See Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR
Underscores Humanitarian Imperative for Refugees as New U.S. Rules Announced
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/XUB8-R6A6.
166 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)-(B), 1158 (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2017).
167 CBP officers have neither the time, training, or legal authority to adjudicate
asylum claims, although that does not necessarily stop officers from overstepping
their role. Such potential for abuse has become even more concerning in light of
recent congressional efforts to lower CBP hiring standards because of difficulty find-
ing enough eligible candidates. See Legislative Efforts to Lower CBP Hiring Standards, AM.
IMMIGR. LAWS. ASSOCIATION (June 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/3LS8-2P6Y. AILA issued
a particularly poignant reminder of why lowering hiring standards is dangerous:
“Congress should not be weakening hiring standards for CBP when they have a long-
standing history with corruption, excessive force, and misconduct. Border patrol
agencies worldwide are prone to corruption, and CBP has been no exception. Agents
brought on during a hiring surge in the 2000’s were frequently corrupt and prone to
misconduct. According to the Government Accountability Office, there were 2,170
reported incidents of CBP employees arrested for misconduct between 2005 and
2012. Almost 200 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted since
October 2004 for corruption-related activities.” AILA, AILA RECOMMENDS VOTE NO
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tion indicate that a person arriving at a port of entry should be
referred to the asylum office if the immigrant indicates an interest
in applying for asylum or a fear of persecution.168 CBP must read a
series of statements advising immigrants of these rights and of a
screening for fear.169 There is no formal requirement that the asy-
lum seeker express fear in a particular manner. This is a significant
point since it protects those who are afraid but who may not have
previously received any legal advice on the protections that might
be available to them in the United States. The sufficiency of non-
verbal clues is also important since many asylum seekers may be
hesitant to speak openly about their fear of persecution or their
best language may be one for which interpreters are not readily
available, such as one of Central America’s many indigenous lan-
guages.170 It can be difficult to revisit a traumatic experience, and a
person may be even more nervous to speak up about issues like
gender identity or sexual abuse when traveling with a family mem-
ber, when accompanied by a human trafficker, or simply when be-
ing questioned by a stranger through an interpreter. In short, CBP
officers have historically been encouraged at this initial stage to
“apply the criteria generously.”171
While this identification and referral might seem like a rela-
tively straightforward duty, the challenge is that because this is seen
as an administrative function as opposed to an evaluation of a pro-
tection claim, there is very little oversight or due process.172 In ad-
dition, the D.C. District Court has held that immigrants in
expedited removal do not have a right to counsel at this stage.173
ON H.R. 2213, “ANTI-BORDER CORRUPTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT” (2017), https://per
ma.cc/3GBJ-G8QV.
168 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2017).
169 See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(i) (2017).
170 See Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility and the Adversarial
Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 484-90 (2016); Declara-
tion of Stuart L. Lustig, M.D., M.P.H., supra note 114.
171 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23.
172 See Letter from American Immigration Council et. al to Meghan H. Mack, Of-
ficer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., John Roth, Inspector
Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/6YDU-VPVY; see also
United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (“There is no hearing, no neutral decision-maker, no evidentiary findings,
and no opportunity for administrative or judicial review. This lack of procedural safe-
guards in expedited removal proceedings creates a substantial risk that noncitizens
subjected to expedited removal will suffer an erroneous removal.” (footnote
omitted)).
173 See Am. Immigration Lawyers Assoc. v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 55 (D.D.C.
1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000)  (“[Banning] an alien’s access to counsel
during the secondary inspection stage is reasonable in view of Congress’s dual pur-
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Although the CBP officer’s decision is reviewed by a supervisor,
this review is done without any opportunity for asylum-seekers to
advocate for themselves.174 Furthermore, concerns arise when this
initial screening is placed in the hands of officers who in many ways
operate day to day with a mindset that they are at war with irregular
immigration.175 As such, if a CBP officer says that a deportee never
expressed fear and the deportee states that she repeated over and
over again that she was afraid to return, the only people who know
the truth of what was actually said are the officer and the asylum
seeker. In one particularly worrying example, CBP records indicate
that only 1.9 percent of 42,093 Hondurans were referred to a credi-
ble fear interview from 2011 to 2012.176 This statistic seems implau-
sible given that Honduras is one of the most dangerous countries
in the world.177 A Human Rights Watch report detailed interviews
with several Hondurans and found that they had been turned away
at the border even though they were fleeing for their lives.178 Sev-
eral indicated that they were discouraged from applying for asylum
and officers attempted to coerce them into signing forms they did
poses in providing fair procedures while creating a more expedited removal pro-
cess.”); see also  2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23 (“No applicant for
admission, either during primary or secondary inspection has a right to be repre-
sented by an attorney - unless the applicant has become the focus of a criminal investi-
gation and has been taken into custody. An attorney who attempts to impede in any
way your inspection should be courteously advised of this regulation. This does not
preclude you, as an inspecting officer, to permit a relative, friend, or representative
access to the inspectional area to provide assistance when the situation warrants such
action.”).
174 CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18, at 23, 39 (“CBP has not implemented USCIRF’s
2005 recommendations to videotape interviews for quality assurance purpose and use
testers. CBP does subject all secondary inspection decisions to two levels of supervi-
sory review, but this consists of reviews of the file and conversations with the officer,
not observing the interview.”).
175 The union that represents CBP’s officers has stated that U.S. “political leaders
try to keep us from doing our jobs” and that “[t]here is no greater physical or eco-
nomic threat to Americans today than our open border.” National Border Patrol Council
Endorses Donald Trump for President, NAT’L BORDER PATROL COUNCIL, https://perma
.cc/M79A-MZAY.
176 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON’T HAVE RIGHTS HERE”: US BORDER SCREENING
AND RETURNS OF CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF SERIOUS HARM 23 (2014), https://per
ma.cc/QW54-JZKD.
177 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 309 (2017) (“Rampant crime and
impunity for human rights abuses remain the norm in Honduras. Despite a down-
ward trend in recent years, the murder rate is among the highest in the world.”),
https://perma.cc/T6SF-99B2; OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
HONDURAS 2017 CRIME & SAFETY REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/39GP-8F2V; BU-
REAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HONDURAS 2016
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/M7QG-K4M4.
178 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 176, at 26.
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not understand.179 “The officers don’t pay attention to you. If you
say you are afraid they say they ‘can’t do anything,’” one deported
Honduran told Human Rights Watch.180 These concerns are sup-
ported by a growing number of complaints by asylum seekers stat-
ing that they have presented themselves at a port of entry and
declared that they are seeking asylum, sometimes on multiple occa-
sions, only for CBP to promptly turn them away.181
The American Immigration Council and the American Civil
Liberties Union filed a complaint with DHS calling for an investiga-
tion into reports of numerous people being turned away at the bor-
der despite expressing a fear of return.182 In one of the cases
summarized in the complaint, a Salvadoran woman fleeing politi-
cal persecution with her three-year-old child was laughed at by a
CBP officer and sent back to Mexico when she expressed a fear of
return to her home country.183 When she came back the next day
and pleaded that she was fleeing for her life based on death threats
and an attack on her brother because of her political ties, she was
yelled at and once again returned to Mexico.184 Seeing no other
option, she then crossed the Rio Grande River and was caught and
detained.185 When a different CBP officer screened her and re-
ferred her to a credible fear interview, an asylum officer deter-
mined that she indeed had a credible fear and referred her to an
immigration court.186 Cases like this are a disturbing  trend sug-
gesting that the CBP referral process is not appropriately protect-
ing asylum seekers.
In May 2017, Human Rights First published a report docu-
menting 125 incidents where CBP officers illegally turned away asy-
lum seekers at seven major ports of entry along the border between
late 2016 to April 2017. The cases included asylum seekers from
Central America, Colombia, and Turkey, among others. These in-
dividuals were fleeing persecution for reasons ranging from trans-
179 Id. at 27.
180 Id.
181 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19; Press Release, Human Rights First, Au-
dio Recording Reveals Border Agents Turning Back Asylum Seekers (July 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/RR9A-L2U6; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19; CTR. FOR MIGRATION
STUDIES & CRISTOSAL, supra note 46; see also ACLU, supra note 18; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 176; Campos & Friedland, supra note 12; Letter from American
Immigration Council, supra note 19.
182 Letter from American Immigration Council, supra note 19.
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gender identity to a role as a major political opposition leader.187
The American Immigration Council, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, and Latham & Watkins LLP have filed a lawsuit to explicitly
challenge these unlawful turnarounds on the grounds that they vio-
late the statutory right to apply for asylum, the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act regarding unlawfully withholding agency action,
procedural due process, and the principle of non-refoulement.188
Unfortunately, the gravity of these abuses is not a new revelation. A
2005 study conducted by the U.S. Commission of International Re-
ligious Freedom reported that for each question about fear asked,
the likelihood of referral to a credible fear interview doubled.189
This study described more than 400 secondary inspections and
found great variation in whether immigration officials read the re-
quired advisals in Form I-876A to border crossers.190 One of the
more upsetting findings was that at the San Ysidro port of entry
only 9.7% of immigrants were read a particular paragraph regard-
ing asylum that was supposed to be mandatory.191 The study also
found that the reading of that same paragraph made an immigrant
seven times more likely to be given a referral to a credible fear
interview.192
The Commission revisited this issue in 2016, and among the
key findings in its updated report were “continuing and new con-
cerns about CBP officers’ interviewing practices and the reliability
of the records they create, including: flawed Border Protection in-
ternal guidance that conflates CBP’s role with that of USCIS; cer-
tain CBP officers’ outright skepticism, if not hostility, toward
187 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19.
188 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Duke,
No. 3:17-cv-02366-W-KSC (S. D. Cal. filed July 12, 2017) (Bloomberg Law, Court
Dockets).
189 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPE-
DITED REMOVAL: VOLUME II: EXPERT REPORTS 17-18 (2005) https://perma.cc/3UZW-
LYP5.
190 See id. at 8, 13-19.
191 Id. at 14 tbl.2.2. The CBP was supposed to read the following statement: “U.S.
law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution, harm or torture
upon return to their home country. If you fear or have a concern about being re-
moved from the United States or about being sent home, you should tell me so dur-
ing this interview because you may not have another chance. You will have the
opportunity to speak privately and confidentially to another officer about your fear or
concern. That officer will determine if you should remain in the United States and
not be removed because of that fear.” Id. at 13.
192 Id. at 17; see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 825, 858-61
(C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 321 F. App’x 625 (9th
Cir. 2009) (expressing deep concern based on this study and finding that it justified,
in part, an injunction to ensure sufficient humanitarian screening).
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asylum claims; and inadequate quality assurance procedures.”193
Similarly, a report by Appleseed found that the United States failed
to appropriately screen unaccompanied children for asylum and
other protections as required under the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion and Reauthorization Act of 2008.194 Furthermore, the report
determined that the United States repatriated children to Mexico
without ensuring that they would be cared for in a safe
environment.195
2. Credible Fear Interviews
Beyond the initial stage of CBP referral, there are also several
other limitations in the credible fear process that make meaningful
access to asylum difficult. These limitations include an ambiguous
burden of proof and persuasion, limits on access to counsel, and
restricted opportunities for appeal. Credible fear interviews
(“CFIs”) are conducted by asylum officers trained in immigration
law, although they are not required to be attorneys, in contrast
with immigration judges.196 The interviews may be as short as thirty
to sixty minutes. They also are often performed telephonically,
sometimes on a three-way call with an interpreter, and they gener-
ally occur very quickly after the CBP referral, a period during
which the immigrant is detained.197 As such, an asylum seeker has
very little opportunity to prepare a case, consult with an attorney,
and convey a story to the asylum officer. In one particularly inter-
esting study, a researcher found:
Comparing the outcomes of televideo and in-person cases in
federal immigration courts, it reveals an outcome paradox: de-
tained televideo litigants were more likely than detained in-per-
son litigants to be deported, but judges did not deny
respondents’ claims in televideo cases at higher rates. Instead,
these inferior results were associated with the fact that detained
litigants assigned to televideo courtrooms exhibited depressed
engagement with the adversarial process—they were less likely
193 CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18, at 2.
194 See generally APPLESEED, CHILDREN AT THE BORDER: THE SCREENING, PROTECTION
AND REPATRIATION OF UNACCOMPANIED MEXICAN MINORS 31-45 (2011), https://perma
.cc/FGH8-JHCV.
195 See generally id.
196 See SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 72, for an interesting look at how determi-
nations vary based on an asylum officers’ backgrounds, including whether they are a
lawyer.
197 See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (2017) (requiring detention until the credible fear
determination); CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18, at 36, 38 n.53 (reporting that most
CFIs occurred telephonically as of 2014 and interviews occurred within nine days of
referral).
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to retain counsel, apply to remain lawfully in the United States,
or seek an immigration benefit known as voluntary
departure.198
In addition, asylum officers are now being advised in a revised
Credible Fear Lesson Plan to make full credibility determina-
tions,199 which is exceptionally difficult to do telephonically with
limited ability to assess the immigrant’s demeanor.
Another significant challenge to meaningful access to asylum
through the CFI process is the vagueness of the burden of proof
used in CFIs. Officially, the burden is a “significant possibility” of
eligibility for asylum, which translates to a significant possibility of a
reasonable probability of persecution.200 Neither the CFI standard
nor the asylum standard is a traditional or well-defined burden of
proof, although asylum’s reasonable possibility standard is less than
“more likely than not,”201 and a significant possibility is less than a
reasonable possibility. Still, the breadth of the ambiguity leaves a
great deal of room for discretion and abuse. However, there are
early indications that the Trump Administration is seeking to take
a harsher approach. For example, DHS made substantial changes
to the Credible Fear Lesson Plan for asylum officers in February of
2017.202 Among the changes was the removal of a section advising
that “[w]hen there is a reasonable doubt regarding the outcome of
a credible fear determination, the applicant likely merits a credible
fear determination.”203 Instead of advising officers to err on the
side of referring people for a full hearing, the new lesson plan sim-
ply states that reasonable doubt may be a factor to consider.204 In
addition, the changes also removed references to the fact that it is
not the asylum officer’s job to make a final determination as to
whether the applicant is credible, and they replace references to
198 Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 933
(2015).
199 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 18-23.
200 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(2) (2017) (stating the burden for credible fear); 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (2017) (stating the burden for asylum). It also is worth noting
that Convention Against Torture protection relies on a higher burden– “more likely
than not.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (2017). As such, the standard at the credible fear
stage is a significant possibility that someone more likely than not would be tortured.
201 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (2017). Although there is no clear demarcation of what
constitutes a well-founded fear, it is often referred to as low as 10 percent risk based
on oft-cited dicta in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
202 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23.
203 Compare 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 17, with U.S. CITI-
ZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR 16 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 CREDIBLE
FEAR LESSON PLAN], https://perma.cc/NM7B-93R4 [hereinafter U.S.C.I.S. 2014].
204 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 17.
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the “significant possibility” standard with a totality of the circum-
stances analysis.205 Other revisions also appear to be setting the
stage for more adverse credibility determinations, including a
greater focus on records of previous statements to CBP.206 This is
deeply concerning because written records of CBP interviews
should not be considered fully reliable because they are not verba-
tim transcripts even though they are written to appear as though
they are.207 In an amicus brief, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA) cited the example of an interview where a
noncitizen stated that he was coming to the United States to look
for work.208 AILA noted that the interview “almost certainly never
happened” as transcribed, given that the interviewee was a three-
year-old child.209 Taken as a whole, these changes to the lesson
plan suggest an effort to treat the credible fear interview like a full
adjudication with a higher burden rather than the initial screening
that it is meant to be.
Even prior to these changes, the U.S. Commission on Interna-
tional Religious Freedom had found that the CFI lesson plan had
moved too far toward a full adjudication when it was meant to be
merely a screening interview prior to a full immigration court
hearing.210
In addition, asylum seekers have been given limited access to
counsel during these proceedings. Regulations provide for an asy-
lum seeker to “consult with any person or persons of his or her
choosing” prior to the interview, but the regulations do not pro-
vide for representation at the interview.211 Instead, an attorney or
representative is allowed to observe and may make a statement at
205 Compare 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 18, with 2014 CREDI-
BLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 203, at 17.
206 Compare 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 18-19, with 2014
CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 203, at 18. In addition, initial numbers show
a recent drop in credible fear findings at CFIs, although it is too early to tell the cause
with any certainty. See  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 14.
207 See Lin Lin Tang v. U.S. Attorney General, 578 F.3d 1270, 1279-81 (11th Cir.
2009); Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2007); Ramsameachire v.
Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The airport interview is an inherently
limited forum for the alien to express the fear that will provide the basis for his or her
asylum claim, and the BIA must be cognizant of the interview’s limitations when using
its substance against an asylum applicant.”); see also Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d
157 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing challenges presented by language barriers).
208 See Brief of Amicus, American Immigration Lawyers Association, at 3-5, Matter
of M-R-R- (BIA) (discussing the unreliability of CBP interview records for purposes of
impeachment), https://perma.cc/A3VF-5G8G.
209 Id. at 5.
210 CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18, at 36.
211 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (2017).
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the end of the interview at the discretion of the asylum officer.212
Also, even at stages where they are permitted counsel, applicants
often struggle to find and communicate with lawyers while held at
remote rural detention facilities.213 This is a serious challenge
given the dramatic difference that counsel can make in asylum pro-
ceedings. For example, in one government study, applicants found
to have a credible fear won asylum in 25% of cases with representa-
tion and 2% of cases without representation.214
These problems are further compounded by limitations on
the right to appeal erroneous decisions. If someone is found not to
have a credible fear, they may appeal the decision to an immigra-
tion judge for a de novo hearing,215 but there is no further formal
appeal, no right to counsel during the hearing, no opening or clos-
ing statements, and no more than seven days from the asylum of-
fice interview to the court hearing.216 If the trial-level immigration
judge misapplies the law or makes an error, the asylum applicant is
statutorily barred from any further appeal or habeas review.217
The lack of oversight and appeal also leads to additional com-
plications when an asylum seeker is erroneously removed and then
tries to reenter the United States because he is still afraid of re-
turning to his country of origin. When a person with a preexisting
removal order enters the United States, that order is reinstated.218
If someone with a reinstated order expresses a fear, she is referred
to a Reasonable Fear Interview (“RFI”) instead of a CFI.219 This
severely limits eligibility for relief even though someone may have
the exact same claim as a person in a CFI. In an RFI, the immigrant
must show a reasonable possibility of persecution, which is de-
scribed as equivalent to the burden in a full immigration court
hearing, as opposed to the lower burden in a CFI.220 If someone
passes an RFI at the asylum office, they are referred to immigration
212 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) (2017).
213 CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 18, at 52-53.
214 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 189, at 239.
215 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2017); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g), 1003.42(d),
1208.30 (2017).
216 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42 (2017).
217 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), (e) (2017); see Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 431-34 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), (e)
prohibited review of an expedited order of removal);  Shunaula v. Holder, 732 F.3d
143, 145-47 (2d Cir. 2013); Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 328-330 (7th Cir. 2010);
Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443, 446-49 (5th Cir. 2001); Meng Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132
(9th Cir. 2001), vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).
218 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8 (2017).
219 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(b) (2017).
220 See 2017 CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 23, at 13.
2017] VANISHING PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE 131
court for withholding-only proceedings.221 This means that they
must meet a substantially higher burden of proof, and, even if suc-
cessful, they will be unable to petition on behalf of a spouse or
children, they will never be able travel outside the U.S. and they
will forever live in legal limbo, under the cloud of a removal order,
and without a path to lawful permanent residence.222 Given the
due process concerns previously mentioned, there are serious risks
that people with legitimate asylum claims will be erroneously re-
moved and then placed into withholding only proceedings when
they attempt to enter the United States a second time. These fac-
tors further limit meaningful access to asylum.
3. Considerations for Advocates
Additional measures to ensure accountability are necessary if
the United States is going to live up to its asylum obligations. Mech-
anisms should exist to review the cases of people who present
themselves at the border seeking asylum and state that they previ-
ously were removed from the United States despite expressing a
fear of return. Currently, there is no clear way to verify these
claims.223 As a result, many of these people are placed into with-
holding-only proceedings, a more limited form of relief than asy-
lum for people with prior removal orders.224 CBP officers should
be further trained in the importance of protecting potential asy-
lum seekers and the breadth of conduct that is sufficient for a re-
ferral. Resources also should be allocated to create a protection
corps within CBP that would help monitor and review credible fear
referrals.225 In addition, advocates must push back against “re-
forms” that seek to blur the line between CBP referrals, CFIs, and
full asylum hearings. With these policies in flux, it is important that
advocates keep abreast of changing standards and that they watch
for inconsistent or improper implementation that places too great
221 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) (2017).
222 See 8 CFR § 208.16 (2017). See generally PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW
CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS & PEA. IMMIGRATION RES. CTR., WITHHOLDING-ONLY
PROCEEDINGS TOOLKIT (2014), https://perma.cc/7U58-AJ4U.
223 However, one interesting recent innovation is the use of motions under 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.5 to reopen CBP decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (2017); Select Motions to Reopen
DHS-Issued Removal Orders, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (last visited Dec. 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/5MWS-JVGS. Although such motions have traditionally been used to reo-
pen decisions by USCIS and not CBP, the relevant regulations predate the dissolution
of the INS and are thus relevant to both subdivisions of the government.
224 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 241.8 (2017).
225 See, e.g., H.R. 3020, 115th Cong. (2017), https://perma.cc/DDE6-VW95.
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a burden on asylum seekers prior to their ability to access a full
hearing.
In addition to encouraging these improvements, there also are
several steps that advocates could take to help ensure that asylum
claims are not lost at the CBP referral stage or at CFIs. Attorneys
should explore new ways to reach out to asylum seekers before they
arrive at ports of entry.226 Education programs and literature along
the border could do more to alert potential asylum seekers of the
protections available and their rights and to explain what they
should expect at the border. Lawyers will need to continue to build
binational relationships and to search for creative solutions to assist
immigrants in Mexico, keeping in mind that providing legal ser-
vices in Mexico is more complex than organizing representation
on the U.S. side of the border.227 Advocates also should work with
communities in the United States to share information and re-
sources through international family and community networks.
Also, while it is in no way a substitute for the protections discussed
supra, arriving at the border with a brief, written statement of fear
could make it more difficult for CBP to turn people away. How-
ever, attorneys should be cautious to ensure that an increase in
preparation does not become mandatory. A norm that everyone
arrives at the border with a complete asylum application and
packet of evidence would ignore the reality that many asylum seek-
ers flee their homes in desperate circumstances and with no access
to counsel on either side of the border. They should not be ex-
pected, and are certainly not required under the law, to have ob-
tained counsel or familiarized themselves with the intricacies of
asylum law before arriving at the border. Furthermore, there is the
risk that CBP will accuse anyone who is well prepared of having
been coached to memorize a manufactured claim or will suggest
that those arriving without pre-prepared evidence do not have
bona fide claims.228
Finally, even as the administration seeks to reject meritless
claims as quickly as possible,229 it is important to emphasize that
226 It is important to remember that there is nothing illegal in presenting oneself at
a port of entry, but attorneys should be cautious of the fact that they cannot ethically
advise clients to cross the border illegally.
227 Practically, it may be difficult for U.S. lawyers to obtain the appropriate visa for
Mexico if they are not licensed to practice law in Mexico and intend to provide direct
services.
228 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19.
229 See Kelly, Implementing, supra note 1. In an earlier draft of this memorandum, the
heading “Enhancing Asylum Referrals and Credible Fear Determinations Pursuant to
Section 235(b)(l) of the INA” was titled “Restoring Integrity to Asylum Referrals and
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initial CBP screening and even CFIs are not the appropriate places
to make such determinations. As discussed above, eligibility for asy-
lum is an extremely complex determination under law that re-
quires substantial specialized training for adjudications. There is
no way to instantly separate meritorious and non-meritorious
claims at the border, and any effort to do so is certain to result in
the rejection of legitimate claims. The price of speed should never
be human lives.
C. Safe Third Country Agreements
Recent efforts by various nations to curb the flow of migrants,
as detailed in Section II(A) above, have been coupled with at-
tempts to deem countries through which asylum seekers transit a
“safe third country” or “first country of asylum,” thereby providing
legal cover to turn back asylum seekers arriving at their borders.230
In doing so, asylum seekers are exposed to the possibility of being
returned, with only a cursory admissibility determination, to a
country through which they transited that has provided or theoreti-
cally could have provided protection.231 Prima facie consideration
of this concept may lead States to find such a system logical and
convenient. If a nation through which an asylum seekers transited
has, or could have, provided adequate protection, why should the
asylum seeker not be required to return there to seek protection?
The answer lies in the rights afforded to asylum seekers, the appli-
cation of the safe third country concept, and States’ failure to ad-
here to the procedural protections that attach when attempting to
return asylum seekers to a third country. Additionally, because the
safe-third country concept provides States a convenient mechanism
for summarily turning away unwanted asylum seekers, countries
that are, in fact, not safe for migrants may be designated as such,
Credible Fear Determinations Pursuant to Section 235(b)(l) of the INA” with much
harsher rhetoric suggesting that “aliens who file meritless claims should be removed
as quickly as possible.” See Unofficial Draft Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration En-
forcement Improvements Policies (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/H9S7-WGT2. It is un-
clear whether the administration went with a different version because it decided the
language was inappropriate or because it wanted to mask the intent of the memoran-
dum. However, it is worth noting that the memorandum came out just as the adminis-
tration was struggling with challenges to its “Muslim ban” executive order, with
Trump suggesting he could issue a new version with language that would accomplish
the same thing but that would be easier to defend in court. See Trump’s Travel Ban: The
Legal Path Ahead for New Executive Order, VOICE AM. (Feb. 23, 2017, 10:54 PM), https://
perma.cc/4ZV6-MZZZ.
230 See Bill Frelick et al., supra note 135, at 195.
231 See id.
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amounting to refoulement in some cases.232
Policy and legal experts concur that nothing in international
law requires asylum seekers to exercise their right to seek asylum in
the first country they enter.233 UNHCR further determined:
[A]n examination of the internationally accepted principles re-
lating to asylum reveals that none of them suggest—much less
prescribe—that the right to seek asylum has to be exercised in
any particular country, or that a person who has been forced to
escape his country to save his life or freedom would forfeit his
right to seek asylum if he does not exercise it in the first country
whose territory he has entered.234
However, multilateral and bilateral agreements have codified,
in certain circumstances, the requirement that asylum seekers ap-
ply for asylum in a “safe” third country.235 For example, in 2002 the
United States and Canada signed a safe third country agreement to
prevent those in the territory of either country from applying for
asylum in the other.236 Implemented in 2005, the agreement does
include exceptions for those with close family ties in the desired
destination.237 However, distinct differences in asylum law, includ-
ing the United States’ restrictive case law on children seeking pro-
tection from criminal gangs, exist between the two countries.238 As
a result, some asylum seekers could expect to receive protection in
Canada not afforded to them in the United States. In the wake of
President Trump’s restrictive asylum policies, many Canadian orga-
nizations have called for the agreement’s suspension.239
232 See id. (discussing Turkey, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia as “safe third
countries”).
233 See von Sternberg, supra note 58.
234 Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
235 See Michelle Foster, Responsibility Sharing or Shifting? “Safe” Third Countries and
International Law, 25 REFUGE 64 (2008) (describing the Agreement Between the Gov-
ernment of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooper-
ation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries
and the Dublin Regulation II).
236 Safe Third Country Agreement, Can.-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002, https://perma.cc/
PAT7-VBMH.
237 See id.
238 See Lisa Frydman & Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treat-
ment of Asylum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS
(Thomas Reuters) Oct. 2012, at 1, https://perma.cc/NS8W-QHCH; see also Tobias
Gomez v. Canada, [2011] F.C. 1093 (Can. Ont.).
239 See AMNESTY INT’L CAN. & CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, Contesting the Des-
ignation of the US as a Safe Third Country (2017), https://perma.cc/6EK5-UMZ8;
Safe Third Country, CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, (last visited Nov. 30, 2017)
https://perma.cc/T46X-ASY5 (listing organizations calling for suspension of the Ca-
nada-US Safe Third Country Agreement).
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Of vital importance to protect against refoulement, any “safe
third country” designation must include a number of procedural
safeguards to ensure that no asylum seeker is turned away without
individualized adjudication of their claim.240 UNHCR explains, “an
asylum seeker cannot be removed to a third country in order that
he apply for asylum there, unless that country agrees to admit him to its
territory as an asylum seeker and consider his request.”241 Outlined by
UNHCR in relation to the European Union’s agreement to return
refugees to Turkey, procedural safeguards should include: an indi-
vidual assessment of possible re-admittance into the previous State;
access to a fair and efficient determination of protection needs;
permission to remain; respect for the standards enshrined in the
1951 Convention and international human rights standards, in-
cluding protection from refoulement; and, where the individual is
entitled to protection, a right to legally stay and a timely durable
solution are also required.242 Furthermore, when applying the
“safe third country concept” the individual asylum seeker must be
guaranteed certain due process rights, principally the right to be
heard, and to “rebut the presumption that she or he will be pro-
tected and afforded the relevant standards of treatment, in a previ-
ous State” based on his or her circumstances.243 When a decision of
inadmissibility is made, the asylum seeker is entitled to appeal that
decision before a court or tribunal.244
International law also provides another protection against the
misuse of the safe third country doctrine – protection against
“chain deportation.” For example, the United States would run
afoul of their non-refoulement obligations by removing a Central
American to Mexico if she was likely to subsequently face deporta-
tion from Mexico to the country where she faces persecution.
UNHCR guidance clearly states that it is refoulement to send some-
one to a “safe” country if that country will then refoule the immi-
240 See NUALA MOLE & CATHERINE MEREDITH, ASYLUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2010), https://perma.cc/UN2Y-QA52;
UNHCR, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE RETURN OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES
FROM GREECE TO TURKEY AS PART OF THE EU-TURKEY COOPERATION IN TACKLING THE
MIGRATION CRISIS UNDER THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AND FIRST COUNTRY OF ASYLUM
CONCEPT (2016) [hereinafter, UNHCR, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS], https://perma.cc/
27VY-9LJC; JOANNE VAN SELM, ACCESS TO PROCEDURES ‘SAFE THIRD COUNTRIES’, ‘SAFE
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN’ AND ‘TIME LIMITS’ (2001), https://perma.cc/ET39-K3UG.
241 See MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 240, at 73 (citation omitted).
242 See UNHCR, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 240.
243 Id. at 2.
244 Id.
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grant to an unsafe country.245 Any link in the chain, from first
removal to the last, violates non-refoulement if the ultimate result is
return to a country where the individual faces persecution.
As detailed in Section I above, the United States’ Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), explicitly provides for the right to
seek asylum in the United States.246 One of the enumerated excep-
tions to this right is, however, a “safe third country” provision. In
full, the statute reads:
(A) Safe third country. Paragraph (1) [the right to seek asylum]
shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General determines
that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilat-
eral agreement, to a country (other than the country of the alien’s
nationality or, in the case of an alien having no nationality, the
country of the alien’s last habitual residence) in which the
alien’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion, and where the alien would have access to
a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or
equivalent temporary protection, unless the Attorney General finds
that it is in the public interest for the alien to receive asylum in
the United States.247
This statutory provision provides that any removal of an asy-
lum seeker to a third country must be undertaken “pursuant to a
bilateral or multilateral agreement.”248 Therefore, absent explicit
acquiescence by a third country through such an official agree-
ment, the Attorney General may not remove an asylum seeker to a
third country pursuant to this provision. Furthermore, the statute
requires that any such bilateral or multilateral agreement ensure
that the individual will not suffer further persecution and will have
access to a full and fair procedure in the third country.249 U.S. reg-
ulation also provides for judicial review of any decision to remove
an individual pursuant to an established bilateral or multilateral
agreement, thereby affording asylum seekers due process in the
United States prior to removal.250 Unaccompanied children are ex-
245 States may not send any asylum seeker to a country that will refoule them to a
third country. See UNHCR, ADVISORY OPINION ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 10 (2007), https://perma.cc/3DJZ-JL53;
see also von Sternberg, supra note 58.
246 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (2017).
247 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2017) (emphasis added).
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(g) (2017).
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plicitly exempt from the safe third country provision.251
While current U.S. law requires a bilateral or multilateral
agreement to effectuate a safe third country agreement, legislative
proposals have been put forth that would change that require-
ment. In January 2017, former Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-
UT-3) reintroduced the Asylum Reform and Border Protection
Act.252 The proposed legislation would have, among other troub-
ling changes, amended the safe third country provision of the INA
to allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to unilaterally declare
a country a safe third country, thereby blocking access to the U.S.
asylum system.253 Due process and requirements as to what consti-
tutes a “safe third country” currently in the INA would presumably
remain. However, the ability to unilaterally declare a safe third
country, for example Mexico,254 creates the possibility that the po-
litical appeal of making such a declaration could override an objec-
tive determination as to the country’s suitability to receive and
protect refugees.
D. Turning Back Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry
Citing Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA, President Trump and
DHS have directed ICE and CBP officers, “to the extent appropri-
ate and reasonably practicable,” to return some arriving individuals
to contiguous territories (Mexico and Canada) while they await re-
moval proceedings before a U.S. immigration judge.255 Without ex-
planation of how such a system would comply with U.S. and
international law, the inclusion of the instruction may be inter-
preted as a tacit approval of officers to turn back and discourage
refugees from seeking asylum.
While the President and DHS appear committed to pursuing
an official border policy to turn immigrants back into Mexico, the
legal complications of establishing and implementing such a
scheme officially, without blatantly violating U.S. law and treaty ob-
251 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(E) (2017).
252 Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 391, 115th Cong.
(2017), https://perma.cc/6JFE-EG84.
253 Id. at § 12; see also Press Release, Human Rights First, House Should Reject Bills
that Undermine U.S. Protection of Refugees (Jan. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/
KQ5V-R7YH.
254 Migrants face extreme dangers in Mexico, and the Mexican asylum system is
inadequate to screen and adjudicate all asylum seekers from Central America. See
Maureen Meyer, Migrants in Transit Face Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, W.O.L.A.,
(Nov.15, 2016), https://perma.cc/QB5F-PBPQ.
255 Kelly, Implementing, supra note 1, at 7; see also Exec. Order No. 13767, supra note
1.
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ligations, may result in a de facto, unofficial policy of turning back
asylum seekers. Based on reports from the past year, such de facto
unofficial policy does, in fact, already exist. Beginning under the
Obama administration, exacerbated by the election of Donald
Trump and continued under his administration, asylum seekers
have been turned back at multiple ports of entry across the entire
U.S. border with Mexico.256 Thus, it is vital that advocates under-
stand the legal limitations, challenge every incident of such turn
backs, and question the legality of any proposed system to turn asy-
lum seekers away at the border.
Following President Trump’s executive order, DHS issued an
implementation memorandum. Section H of the memorandum
states:
[S]ubject to the requirements of section 1232, Title 8, United
States Code, related to unaccompanied alien children and o the
extent otherwise consistent with the law and U.S. international treaty
obligations, CBP and ICE personnel shall, to the extent appropri-
ate and reasonably practicable, return aliens described in sec-
tion 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, who are placed in removal
proceedings under section 240 of the INA - and who, consistent
with the guidance of an ICE Field Office Director, CBP Chief
Patrol Agent, or CBP Director of Field Operations, pose no risk
of recidivism - to the territory of the foreign contiguous country
from which they arrived pending such removal proceedings.257
As explained by Human Rights First:
If Section H of this memorandum were applied to asylum seek-
ers, the United States would adopt a policy of turning asylum
seekers away to face danger, persecution, torture and potential
trafficking in Mexico, and would put non-Mexican asylum seek-
ers at grave risk of onward refoulement to their countries of perse-
cution. Such a system, applied to Mexican and/or non-Mexican
asylum seekers would violate U.S. domestic law and treaty obli-
gations, place already vulnerable refugees in grave peril, further
erode U.S. global leadership and encourage other countries to
shirk their responsibilities under international law and
treaties.258
It also would result in a logistical nightmare for U.S. immigration
advocates who likely would struggle to reach clients in Mexico.
As detailed in Section I above, U.S. law and treaty obligations
256 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 19; see also Letter from American Immigra-
tion Council, supra note 19.
257 Kelly Implementing, supra note 1, at 7 (emphasis added).
258 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 5.
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restrict the administration’s ability to carry out this order. Further-
more, while the memorandum is clearly aimed at the U.S.-Mexico
border, given the U.S.-Canada safe third country agreement, it
would be impossible to apply the order to Mexican nationals, as
there is no doubt such action would constitute direct refoulement of
Mexican asylum seekers to Mexico. Therefore, the legal question,
presented by the Trump Administration’s proposal to rely on Sec-
tion 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA, is whether Central Americans and
other non-Mexican nationals can be forced to wait in Mexico after
expressing a fear to U.S. officials at a port of entry.
DHS memorandum provides for the return to contiguous ter-
ritories for “aliens described in Section 235(b)(2)(A) of the
INA.”259 Section 235(b)(2)(A) indicates that any “alien seeking ad-
mission” who is not entitled to admission be detained for a pro-
ceeding under Section 240.260 However, asylum seekers arriving to
a port of entry and otherwise inadmissible are generally processed
under Section 235(b)(1)(A), the expedited removal provision, re-
quiring that any individual found inadmissible “shall [be] or-
der[ed] . . . removed from the United States without further
hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to
apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.”261 Therefore, be-
cause Section 235(b)(2)(C),262 the provision allowing for removal
to contiguous territories, by its terms only applies to “aliens” de-
scribed in Section 235(b)(2)(A), any inadmissible individual would
have to be provided a judicial proceeding under Section 240 and
not subjected to the expedited removal process. Given DHS’s simul-
taneous push to expand the use of expedited removal and its per-
ceived effectiveness at removing large numbers of inadmissible
immigrants, it is unclear whether or not DHS would trade in use of
expedited removal to take advantage of Section 235(b)(2)(C).
At first glance, the required substitution of Section
235(b)(2)(C) for the distinctly problematic expedited removal
process may appear to provide asylum seekers with a greater level
of due process through the appearance before an immigration
judge.  However, advocates should proceed with caution. While the
statute requires granting of proceedings under Section 240, it is
not at all clear that such a newly established system would, in fact,
provide greater due process.  Those subjected to Section
259 Kelly Implementing, supra note 1, at 7; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2017).
260 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2017).
261 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2017) (emphasis added).
262 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (2017).
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235(b)(2)(C) would be forced to await their hearing in Mexico,
where access to counsel, ability to collect evidence, security, and
assurances against onward deportation are lacking.
In addition, Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA applies only to
those “arriving from a contiguous territory” and Central Americans
arrive through a contiguous country, rather than from a contiguous
country.263 Consider it analogous to the idea that a person flying to
the United States cannot simply be returned to a third country
where they landed for a layover. Under this interpretation, Section
235(b)(2)(C) applies only to the nationals of contiguous countries,
but also cannot be used for asylum seekers originating from these
countries because that would amount to refoulement.
Even if DHS foregoes the expedited removal procedure and
files all arriving asylum cases with the immigration courts before
turning non-Mexican national back into Mexico to await future
proceeding, or if CBP officers simply refuse to acknowledge indi-
viduals’ intention to seek asylum, the Mexican government would
have to either explicitly agree to receive the non-Mexican nation-
als, or unofficially acquiesce to the practice. Following the United
States’ proposal of such a border system, Mexico’s interior secre-
tary, Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, stated, “our legal framework
doesn’t allow this . . . . We told [the U.S.] it is impossible. There is
no way, legally, nor is there capacity.”264 Yet, given the documented
cases of non-Mexican nationals already being turned back into
Mexico, and the Mexican government’s inaction to challenge such
cases, it remains highly concerning that while the United States’
objective to legally turn back immigrants at its border may be
stymied by legal and political realities, the unofficial practice con-
tinues unchallenged.
CONCLUSION
The current assault on immigrants and their rights has been
both shocking and unsurprising. Only sixty-six years ago, still reel-
ing from the deaths of millions of people unable to find refuge,
263 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (2017). Support for this argument can be found in
the fact that the INA has at times distinguished between arriving from and through
countries. See, e.g., Pan American Airways, Inc. v. United States, 135 F.2d 51, 53 (5th
Cir. 1943) (“The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, with the approval
of the Attorney General, shall have power to enter into contracts with transportation
lines for the entry and inspection of aliens coming to the United States from or
through foreign contiguous territory.”).
264 Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico Rejects U.S. Plan to Deport Central Americans to Mexico,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:56 PM), https://perma.cc/4X7A-5KG2.
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the world decided that States could not keep turning their backs
on people in need of protection. Thus, the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion was born, and the reminder to abide by its core humanitarian
principles remains far too relevant today. The Trump Administra-
tion has already signaled where its priorities lie regarding immigra-
tion policy. On March 8, 2017, in a premature exalting of new
enforcement methods, then Secretary of Homeland Security John
Kelly, now Trump’s chief of staff, emphasized the administration’s
commitment to restrictive policies, stating, “enforcement matters,
deterrence matters, and that comprehensive immigration enforce-
ment can make an impact.”265 This shift from comprehensive im-
migration reform to comprehensive immigration enforcement may
have ridden into U.S. policy on a wave of politically expedient fear
mongering, but it is fated to crash into an already constructed wall
– the law.
The U.S. asylum system is grounded in international and do-
mestic law, fortified by advocates and scholars intent on protecting
the rights of the most vulnerable and upholding the rule of law.
The resistance to abusive policies and practice must be constant
and must be comprehensive from the time an asylum seeker begins
their journey. Advocates must engage policymakers and Americans
of all backgrounds, and immigration lawyers, the frontline of
human rights protection, must expand their role in defending and
empowering immigrants while also holding the government
accountable.
This paper aims to call the attention of this growing move-
ment of advocates to a threshold issue – initial access to protection.
As immigration judges are sent to the U.S. immigration detention
centers and the Southern border,266 and thousands of enforce-
ment officers are hastily hired,267 immigration lawyers and advo-
cates across the United States will be needed to ensure asylum
seekers are able to access the U.S. protection system. As detailed in
this paper, asylum seekers have the right to pursue protection in
the United States, and the law requires their reception and the ro-
bust consideration of their claim. Critical debate over every step in
the U.S. asylum system can, and must, continue. Faced with an ad-
265 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary of Homeland
Security John Kelly on Southwest Border Security (March 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/
E48W-3ETX.
266 Julia Edwards Ainsley, Trump Administration Sends Judges to Immigration Detention
Centers – Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://perma.cc/GF3T-DXH8.
267 Eric Katz, Trump Wants DHS to Hire 15,000 for Border Security? Not So Fast, DEF.
ONE (Jan. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/K9CF-ZNGP.
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ministration intent on scapegoating immigrants and capitalizing
on border security fearmongering, those committed to the rule of
law must remain steadfast in their belief that the United States will
not be converted into a nation ruled by demagoguery. Advocates
must mobilize to ensure that individual rights and American ideals
are not the victim of this new American zeitgeist.
